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2 SAHARON SHELAH
Anotated Content
§0 Introduction
[We give lengthy explanations of the problems and proofs for No-New-Reals
iterations (or proper forcing, CS iterations).]
§1 Preservation of not adding reals
[We present sufficient conditions for CS iteration of proper forcing not to
add reals. For this we define “reasonable parameters p” and we have two
main demands. One (clause (c) of Definition 1.8) is a weakening of “α-
proper for every α < ω1”. This time it has the form (on Qi), p-proper
which informally says that: if p ∈ N, Y ⊆ {M ∈ N : M appropriate} is
α-large then for some (N,Qi)-generic condition q ≥ p, q forces that {M ∈
Y : M [G
˜
Q] ∩ V = M} is α-large (the meaning of α− large depends on p),
hence without loss of generality, p has length ω1. The other main demand
(clause (d) of Definition 1.8) is a “weak diamond preventive”.
We then show that α-properness for α < ω1 is sufficient for the first main
demand (in 1.16(3)). The demand on the games for p helps to prove the
preservation of p-properness.]
§2 Delayed properness
[The preservation theorem in the first section does not, for standard p, cover
shooting a club C ⊆ ω1 running away for Cδ ⊆ δ = sup(Cδ), Cδ small (see
§3). For this we will use (p, α, β)-proper for enough pairs α ≤ β < ℓg(p) (so
starting from β-large we get α-large; for many α we can choose β = α but
during the inductive proof we pass through cases of α < β).
Here we introduce various definitions and basic facts needed. We discuss ax-
ioms, version of the properties preserved by CS iterations and strengthening
of the iteration Lemmas of §1.]
§3 Example: shooting a thin club
[We present the natural forcing showing κ = 2 is interesting (not only
κ = ℵ0) (from [Sh:b, Ch.VIII,§4]).
We show that the natural forcing (see above) for running away from Cδ ⊆ δ,
of small order type (see [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§2]) falls under our framework for
delayed properness. We give examples: running away from 〈Cδ,0, Cδ,1 : δ <
ω1 limit〉, Cδ,0, Cδ,1 are disjoint closed subsets of δ with no restrictions on
their order type so we ask for C,C ∩ Cδ,0 or C ∩ Cδ,1 is bounded in δ and
more.]
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§4 Second preservation of not adding reals
[We give a sufficient condition for the limit not to add reals. We here
are weakening the demand “p-proper”, using (p, α, f(α))-proper instead
(p, α, α)-proper, what we called delayed properness. The price is that here
p has length of large cofinality, so essentially we catch our tails on a club of
it. Also the Lemma here covers the examples.]
§5 Problematic Forcing
[We discuss further generalizations.]
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§0 Introduction
We try to explain our problems and results. If the explanations look opaque,
try to return to them after reading at least part of the proof. Sections §0, §1 are
based on lectures in the logic seminar in the Hebrew University, Spring 1997, whose
participants I thank. On the history see in [Sh:f, V,§7,VIII,§4,XVIII,§1,§2], [Sh 666,
§3].
0.1 Definition. 1) Let K0 be the family of CS iterations, Q¯ = 〈Pi, Q
˜
i : i < α〉, we
denote Pα = Lim(Q¯).
2) We say Q¯ is proper if each Qi is (which means: every f ∈ (
ωω)V
Pi+1
=
(ωω)(V
Pi )Oi is bounded by some g ∈ (ωω)V
Pi
, hence Pj/Pi is proper for i < j ≤ α
(see [Sh:b] or [Sh:f]).
3) We say Q¯ is ωω-bounding if each Qi is
1, hence Pj/Pi is
ωω-bounding for i < j ≤
α.
4) We say Q¯ is NNR if i < α⇒ Pi+1 adds no reals.
[Equivalently: i < α⇒ Qi adds no reals and β < α⇒ Pβ adds not reals.]
Discussion: It would be nice if also this (NNR) would be preserved in limit. But
this is wrong for two known reasons, obstacles, explained below:
⊗
1 weak diamond⊗
2 existence of clubs.
Our aim here is to weaken the medicine one uses against
⊗
2 for CS iterations of
proper forcing notions. Let us explain the “obstacles”.
Concerning the weak diamond:
Let η¯ = 〈ηδ : δ < ω1, δ limit〉, ηδ = 〈ηδ(n) : n < ω〉 where ηδ is an ω-sequence of
ordinals (strictly) increasing with limit δ. Let D be a non-principal ultrafilter on
ω.
For f ∈ ω12, δ < ω1 limit, let AvD(f, ηδ) = ℓ iff {n : f(ηδ(n)) = ℓ} ∈ D.
0.2 Question[CH]: Given e¯ = 〈eδ : δ < ω1 limit〉, eδ ∈ {0, 1} is there f ∈
ω12 such
that for a club of δ < ω1 we have eδ = AvD(f, ηD)?
Naturally, trying to prove consistency we should use a CS iteration Q¯, for simplicity
we assume
1where Q is ωω bounded (in the universe V ) if every f ∈ (ω)V
Q
is bounded by some g ∈ (ωω)V
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V |= GCH, Q¯ = 〈Pi, Q
˜
i : i < ω2〉
Qi = Qe¯ (i.e. Q
˜
i = Qe¯
˜
) where
Qe¯ =
{
f : for some ζ < ω1, f ∈
ζ2 and for every limit
δ ≤ ζ we have AvD(f, ηδ) = eδ
}
.
This is a very nice forcing notion - it is proper (even < ω1-proper, see below) and
NNR and for every α < ω1,Iα = {f ∈ Qe¯ : α ⊆ Dom(f)} is a dense open subset
of it.
But the weak diamond ([DvSh 65] or see [Sh:b, Ch.XII,§1] = [Sh:f, AP,§1]) tells us
for this case that the answer is no, that is:
∃e¯∀f ∈ ω12∃statδ(eδ 6= AvD(f, ηδ)).
In fact this holds for any function Av′ :
⋃
δ<ω1
δ2→ {0, 1}.
Why is Qe¯ NNR?
Let 〈Ni : i ≤ ω
2〉 be increasing continuously with i, Qe¯ ∈ N0 where Ni ≺
(H (χ),∈) is countable, N¯ ↾ (i + 1) ∈ Ni+1; let δi = Ni ∩ ω1. So 〈δi : i ≤ ω2〉 is
strictly increasing continuously. But {ηδω2 (n) : n < ω} ⊂ δω2 has order type ω, so
W = {i < ω2 : ∃n(δi ≤ ηδω2 (n) < δi+1)} has order type ω.
So we can find ℓn < ω such that
∧
n<ω
∧
m<ω
ω×n+ℓn+m /∈W . Let p ∈ Qe¯∩N0, let τ
˜
:
ω → Ord, τ
˜
∈ N0. We choose by induction on n, pn ∈ Qe¯ such that p ≤ pn, pn−1 ≤
pn, pn ∈ Nωn+ℓn+1, pn force some value to τ
˜
(n) and on [δωm+ℓm , δω(m+1)+ℓm+1) ∩
Rang(ηδ)\ Dom(p) which agrees with eδω2 .
So
(∗) the desired demand on Q¯i (guaranteeing Pα in NNR) should exclude the
Qe¯’s.
0.3 Definition. Let K1 be the class of proper
ωω-bounding iteration Q¯ ∈ K0, let
K2 be the class of NNR iterations Q¯ ∈ K1, and let K3 be the class of Q¯ ∈ K2 such
that
(∗) if χ is large enough (so a¯ ∈ H (χ)),
N ≺ (H (χ),∈) countable,
6 SAHARON SHELAH
Q¯ ∈ N ,
i ∈ ℓg(Q¯) ∩N ,
p ∈ Pi+1 ∩N ,
q0, q1 ∈ Pi are (N,Pi)-generic
(i.e. qℓ  N [G
˜
Pi ] ∩ V = N) and moreover
qℓ  “G
˜
Pi ∩N = G
∗” and
p ↾ i ≤ qℓ
then we can find q′0, q
′
1, G
∗∗ such that p ↾ (i+ 1), qℓ ≤ q
′
ℓ ∈ Pi+1,
q′ℓ  “G
˜
P ∩N = G
∗∗”,
q′ℓ is (N,Pi+1)-generic, so G
∗∗ ⊆ Pi+1 ∩N is generic over N .
This tries to say:
We know G
˜
Pi ∩N (as being G
∗) and we are looking at N [G∗] (formally, only its
isomorphism type). So we know Q
˜
N
i [G
∗
i ].
We would like to find G′ ⊆ Q
˜
N
i [G
∗] generic over N [G∗], so that G∗, G′ will
determine G∗∗. But we need a guarantee that G′ will have an upper bound in
Q
˜
i[GPi ]. If we know GPi , fine; but in a sense, we are given 2 candidates (by q0, q1
and can increase then to q′0 ↾ i, q
′
1 ↾ i) and have to find G
′ “accepted” by both.
This (weak diamond) obstacle was overcome, with a price, i.e. more than be-
ing in K3, [Sh:f, V,§7] using ℵ1-completeness systems and [Sh:f, XVIII,§4] for 2-
completeness systems (phrased in [Sh:f, XVIII,§2] without them).
Unfortunately, this does not suffice: there is an extreme example where e.g. if
for q0, q1 incompatible in Qi, E
˜
i a Qi-name of a club, for some α(q0, q1) we have:
qℓ ≤ q
′
ℓ
qℓ  “E
˜
i ∩ δ = E
δ
i ⇒ E
δ0
i ∩E
δ1
1 \α(q0, q1) is finite”.
This represents the reason, the obstacle which we shall call
⊗
2, it is overcomed
(with a price) either with (< ω1)-properness or by a kind of “finite powers are
proper” (see below).
0.4 Definition. 1) Q is α-proper when:
if N¯ = 〈Ni : i ≤ α〉 is ≺- increasing continuously, α ∈ N0
Ni ≺ (H (χ),∈) countable, N¯ ↾ (i+ 1) ∈ Ni+1,
Q ∈ N0 and p ∈ Q ∩N0
then there is q, p ≤ q ∈ Qi such that q is (Ni, q)-generic for i ≤ α.
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2) A forcing notion Q is (<+ ω1)-proper if the above holds for any α < ω1 even
omitting “α ∈ N0”. We say Q is (< ω1)-proper if Q is α-proper for any α < ω1.
So (< ω1)-proper is an antidote to such problems, i.e. against “reason ⊗2”. Okay
for specializing a Aronszajn tree and many others, but it seems to me since [Sh
177] too strong: it kills the following:
0.5 Question: Let C¯ = 〈Cδ : δ < ω1, δ limit〉, Cδ ⊆ δ = sup(Cδ), otp(Cδ) = ω or at
least < δ, is there a club E of ω1 such that δ < ω1 ⇒ δ > sup(Cδ ∩E)? (i.e. is this
consistent with CH).
We consider
Q1C¯ =
{
f¯ : for some non-limit α < ω1 we have f ∈
α2, f−1({1}) closed
and δ < α limit ⇒ sup(f−1({1}) ∩ Cδ) < δ
}
.
This is the natural forcing for adding a club such that
∧
δ
[Cδ ∩E bounded in δ]. So
E “runs away” from each Cδ. This forcing notion is NOT ω-proper: if 〈Ni : i ≤ ω〉
satisfies CNω∩ω1 = {Ni∩ω1 : i < ω}, then no f ∈ Q is (Ni, G)-generic, for infinitely
many i’s.
A solution ([Sh:f, XVIII,§2]) was to demand “essentially” e.g. Pi × Pi is proper
for i < ℓg(Q¯). While this is fine for Q1i , this seems to exclude specializing an
Aronszajn tree by not adding reals. We will deal with a condition implied by both
(< ω1)-proper and (essentially) “the square of the forcing notion is proper”.
Continuing explanation:
So for CS iteration Q¯ of proper forcing the “reasons”, “dangers” for adding reals
may come from:
⊗
0 (0-reason, danger) some Qi adds reals and⊗
1 weak diamond.
Against this, we will assume something like (Definition 0.3): many times in some
sense q0, q1 ∈ Pi are (N,Pi)-generic, p ∈ Q
˜
i ∩ N, qℓ Pi “G
˜
Pi ∩ N = G
∗” and
for some G′, q′0 ≥ q0, q
′
1 ≥ q1 in Pi+1 we have G
′ ⊆ (Q
˜
i ∩ N)[G
∗] and q′ℓ Pi
“G
˜
Qi ∩N [G
∗] = G′” and p ∈ G′.
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It is simpler in the proof to allow qℓ(ℓ < n) for some n < ω; but in addition we
have the obstacle:
⊗
2 adding almost disjoint clubs ([Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§1]).
There were two medicines:
(α) α-proper for every α < ω1
(β) something like Pi × Pi is proper.
In the proofs we have a situation:
(∗) Q¯ ∈ N0 ∈ N
N0 ≺ (H (χ),∈) and N ≺ (H (χ),∈) are countable
qℓ is (N,Pi)-generic and (N0, Pi)-generic
qℓ forces that G
˜
Pi ∩N = Gℓ, (for ℓ < 2)
G∗ = G1 ∩N0 = G2 ∩N0
i, j, p ∈ N0[G
∗], i ≤ j ≤ ℓg(Q¯)
p ∈ Pj , p ↾ i ∈ G
∗ (possibly more).
We would like to find G′ ⊆ PNj /G
∗ generic over N0 such that q0 and q1 both forces
that it has an upper bound in Pj/G
˜
Pi . If j = i + 1 this means G
′ ⊆ Q
˜
i[G
∗] is
generic over N0 such that q0, q1 both force that G
′ has an upper bound in Q
˜
i[GPi ].
It is natural to demand G′ ∈ N , otherwise the two possible generic extensions (for
q0 and q1) become not related. For the case j = i+1, a “weak diamond medicine”
should help us. But we need it for every j, naturally we prove it by induction on
j, and the successor case can be reduced to the case j = i+ 1.
But to continue in a limit we need G′ ∈ N and more: for some intermediate
N1, N0 ∈ N1 ∈ N also
∧
ℓ
[qℓ  N1[G
˜
Pi ] ∩ V = N1]. So the clubs of elementary
submodels which q0, q1 induce on {M ≺ N : M ∈ N} should have non-trivial
intersection. This is a major point and it has always appeared in some form. Here
the medicine against
⊗
2 should help, in some way there will be many possible
N1’s; but its help has a price: we have to carry it during the induction. On the
other hand the models playing the role of N1 may change, we may “consume it and
discard it”.
Note that the discussion is on two levels. Necessary limitations of universes with
CH on the one hand, and how we try to carry the inductive proof on appropriate
iterations on the other hand; the connection though is quite tight.
So we shall try for j ∈ ℓg(Q¯)∩N0 to extend the situation with i being replaced by
j while G∗ is being increased to G∗∗. We shall prove by induction suitable facts,
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with G∗∗ the object we are really interested in.
We are given q1, q2 ∈ Pi and would like to find suitable q
′
1, q
′
2 ∈ Pj such that
q′ℓ ↾ i = qℓ (otherwise in limit why is there an upper bound?)
So the real action occur for j limit, so we choose ζn ∈ N∩[i, j) such that ζ0 = i, ζn <
ζn+1 (sometimes better to have i and each ζn non-limit) and
⋃
n<ω
ζn = sup(j ∩N).
You can think of:
in each case of limit j, proving the inductive statement, we choose a “sur-
rogate” for N called N1, during the induction it serves like N in the limit
dealing with ζ0, ζ1, . . . using the induction hypothesis on N1 we get G
∗∗
which may not be in N1 but is in N .
So we try to choose by induction on n, q0,n, q1,n, G
∗
n such that: qℓ,n ∈ Pζn is
(N,Pζn)-generic, qℓ,0 = qℓ, qℓ,n+1 ↾ ζn = qℓ,n, G
∗
n ∈ N1, G
∗
n ⊆ Pζn ∩ N is generic
over N and qℓ,n  “G
˜
Pζn
∩N = G∗n. The construction of the G
∗
n should use little
information on the actual qℓ,n so that the choices of the G
∗
n can be carried say
inside N1 so that 〈G
∗
n : n < ω〉 ∈ N . In fact several models will play a role like N1.
By the proof of the preservation of ωω-bounding we can choose some N1 and de-
mand “qℓ,n gives to each Pζn -name of an ordinal τ
˜
n ∈ N1, only finitely many
possibilities”.
Now how does (< ω1)-proper help?
We can assume in the beginning that 〈N1,γ : γ ∈ A〉 ∈ N is ≺-increasing con-
tinuously, N0 ≺ N1,γ ≺ N, 〈N1,γ : γ ≤ β〉 ∈ Nβ+1 with A =: (j + 1) ∩ N\i and
assume qℓ is (N1,γ , Pi)-generic for γ ∈ A (similarly for q
′
0, q
′
1, j in the conclusion)
and demand qℓ,n is (N1,γ, Pζn)-generic for n < ω and γ ∈ A\ζn. We are ignoring
several points including how the induction change and having ℓ < 2 rather than
ℓ < n(< ω) which complicates life.
How does “Q×Q is proper” help?
We demand things like “(q0, q1) is (N1, Pi×Pi)-generic” so this gives many common
N1’s, but to preserve this we need more complicated situations. Instead of a “tower”
of models of countable length, we have a finite tower of models (say of length 5)
where on the bottom we are computing G∗∗ ∩ Pζn and as we go up less and less is
demanded.
The medicine in the present work is p-properness where “Q is p-proper” say that if
Y is a large family of M ≺ N and p ∈ Q∩N,Q ∈ N then for some q we have p ≤ q
and q is (N,Q)-generic and q  “{M ∈ Y : M [G
˜
Q] ∩ V = M} is large”. (The idea
of the finite tower is retained in the proof). This is quite obvious in hindsight.
Why is it important to be inside N? Otherwise, we could forget about N and we
have q0, q1. We know they have a common candidate but we need to increase them
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to know if and in limit by the regular having bounded in Pi.
“We need a real not a name of a real.”
Note that a sufficient condition for p-properness for Q, if p is standard, is homo-
geneity.
Notation: p denote a reasonable parameter.
We thank Todd Eisworth for many corrections; he has continued this work.
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§1 Preservation of not adding reals
1.1 Definition. We say p = (χ¯, R¯, E¯ , D¯) = (χ¯p, R¯p, E¯ p, D¯p) is a reasonable pa-
rameter if for some ordinal α∗ called ℓg(p) we have:
(a) χ¯ = 〈χα : α < α
∗〉, χα a regular cardinal, H ((
⋃
β<α
χβ)
+) ∈ H (χα)
(b) R¯ = 〈Rα : α < α
∗〉, Rα ∈ H (χα);
we could have asked “Rα a relation on H (χα)”, no real difference for our
purpose; in a sense it codes a club of [H (χα)]≤ℵ0 .
(c) E¯ = 〈Eα : α < α
∗〉 where Eα ⊆ [H (χα)]
≤ℵ0 is stationary
(d) D¯ = 〈Dα : α < α
∗〉, Dα is a function with domain Eα, a ∈ Eα ⇒ Dα(a)
is a pseudo-filter on a, i.e. Dα(a) is a family of subsets of a closed under
supersets, non-empty if α > 0
(and let D−α (a) = (Dα(a))
− = P(a)\Dα(a))
(e) for α < α∗ we let p[α] =: 〈χ¯ ↾ α, R¯ ↾ (α + 1), E¯ ↾ α, D¯ ↾ α〉, so it belongs to
H (χα).
[Why R¯ ↾ (α+ 1)? This makes it an easy demand on Eα : N ∈ Eα ⇒ Rα ∈
N ].
(f) if a ∈ Eα, then for some countable N ≺ (H (χα),∈) we have:
a is the universe of N , so we may write Dα(N) instead of Dα(a) and N ∈ Eα
instead of |N | ∈ Eα
(g) if α < α∗ and N ∈ Eα, then p[α] ∈ N
(h) for N ∈ Eα and X ⊆ N we have:
X ∈ Dα(N) iff (
⋃
β<α
Eβ) ∩X ∩N ∈ Dα(a)
(i) if N ∈ Eα, X ∈ Dα(N), β ∈ α ∩ N and y ∈ N ∩ H (χ
p
β), then for some
M ∈ Eβ ∩X we have X ∩M ∈ Dβ(M) and y ∈M .
1.2 Remark. 1) Note that 〈Eα : α < ℓg(p)〉 are pairwise disjoint by clause (g)
(and clause (e)) so D(N) can be well defined as Dα(N) for the unique α such that
N ∈ Eα).
2) Clearly only Dα(N) ∩P(
⋃
β<α
Eβ) matters.
3) Note that the most natural case is “D(N) is {X ⊆ N : X 6= ∅ mod Dfil}” for
some filter Dfil on N .
4) Natural cases are: Dα(a) is a filter on a, and Dα(a) = {b ⊆ a : a\b /∈ D
′
α(a)} for
a filter D′α(a) on a; we say Dα is dual to D
′
α or Dα = (D
′
α)
+.
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5) We may add in clause (i) of 1.1 that some X ′ ∈ X ∩M belongs to N ∩Dβ(M).
No beginning harm but not necessary at present.
1.3 Definition. 1) In 1.1 we say D¯ is standard if for every α < α∗ and N ∈ Eα
we have
Dα(N) =
{
X ⊆ N : for every γ ∈ N ∩ α and
y ∈ N ∩ ∪{H (χβ) : β ∈ α ∩N} for some
β ∈ N ∩ α\γ and
M ∈ X ∩ Eβ we have y ∈M,
X ∩M ∈ Dβ(M)
}
.
2) We say p is simple if α ≤ β < α∗ ⇒ α ≤p β where we let α ≤p β be the
following partial order on α∗ : α ≤p β iff α ≤ β < α
∗ = ℓg(p) and we have
N ∈ E β & α ∈ N ⇒ M =: N ∩ H (χpα) ∈ E
p
α and N ∈ E
β & α ∈ N & Y ∈
Dβ(N)⇒ Y ∩
⋃
γ<α
E pγ ∈ Dα(M).
3) We say p is standard if (p is a reasonable parameter such that) D¯p is standard.
4) If N ≺ (H (χ),∈) and N ∩ H (χpα) ∈ Eα, (hence α ∈ N, p ↾ α ∈ N,R
p
α ∈ N),
then we let Dα(N) = D
p
α(N) be D
p
α(N ∩H (χ
p
α)).
1.4 Convention: If D¯ = D¯p is standard, we may omit it. If p clear from the content,
we may write Eα instead E pα .
1.5 Definition. 1) We say that p is a winner or a a-winner if:
for every α < ℓg(p), α > 0 and N ∈ E pα , in the game
aα(N) = aα(N, p) (defined below)
the chooser player has a winning strategy where:
2) aα(N, p) is the following game:
a play lasts ω moves, in the n-th move
the challenger choose Xn ∈ Dα(N) such that m < n⇒ Xn ⊆ Xm
the chooser chooses Mn ∈ Xn and Yn ⊆Mn ∩Xn, Yn ∈ D(Mn) ∩N
the challenger chooses Zn ⊆ Yn such that Zn ∈ D(Mn).
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In the end the chooser wins if ∪{{Mn} ∪ Zn : n < ω} ∈ Dα(N).
3) Assume N ∈ N ′ ≺ (H (χ),∈) and p ↾ α ∈ N ′, and, of course, N ≺ N ′ are
countable. The game a′α(N,N
′, p) is defined similarly but during the n-th move,
we demand that all the chosen objects belong to N ′ and in the end the chooser
also chooses X ′n ⊆ Xn, X
′
n ∈ D(N) ∩N
′ and the challenger in the next move has
to satisfy Xn+1 ⊆ X
′
n. Omitting N
′ we mean: for any such N ′ the demand holds.
4) p is a non-a-loser if for α < ℓg(p), α > 0, N ∈ Eα the challenger has no winning
strategy in aα(N, p).
5) “a′α-winner” or “non-a
′
α-loser” means we (in part (1) or part (4)) use a
′
α(N, p).
We say that “the chooser/challenger wins the game aα(N)” if he has a winning
strategy and so “the chooser/challenger does not win the game aα(N)” says the
negation. (Similarly for the other games in this paper).
6) Omitting α means for every α < ℓg(p).
1.6 Observation. 1) If p is a reasonable parameter with the standard D¯, then p is
a winner.
2) If p is a aα-winner then p is a a
′
α-winner; if p is a a-winner, then p is a a
′-winner;
similarly for a non-loser.
Proof. Straight.
1.7 Definition. Assume p is a reasonable parameter, N ∈ E pα , y ∈ N and P ∈ N
is a forcing notion. We let MP [G
˜
P , N, y] =: {M ∈ N : P, y ∈ M and G
˜
P ∩
M is a subset of P ∩M generic over M}. If P is clear from the context, we may
omit it; note that MP [G,N, y] = MP [G ∩N,N, y] so we may write G ∩N instead
of G. If y = ∅ we may omit it.
1.8 Definition. We say Q¯ is p−NNR0ℵ0 iteration if:
(a) Q¯ = 〈Pi, Q
˜
i : i < j(∗)〉 is a CS iteration of proper forcing notions which
belongs to H (χp0), even P(Pj(∗)) ∈ H (χ
p
0)
(b) forcing with Pj(∗) = Lim(Q¯) does not add reals
(c) [long properness] if i ≤ j ≤ j(∗), α < ℓg(p), N ∈ Eα, {i, j, Q¯} ∈ N , the
condition q ∈ Pi is (N,Pi)-generic forcing G
˜
Pi ∩N = G and p ∈ Pj ∩N, p ↾
i ∈ G and Y ⊆ MPi [G,N, y] where y = 〈Q¯, i, j〉 and Y ∈ Dα(N)
(note that from Q¯, G the ordinal i is reconstructible);
then there are G′′, q′ such that:
(α) q′ ∈ Pj , p ≤ q
′ and q ≤ q′ ↾ i
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(β) q′ is (N,Pj)-generic
(γ) q′ forces G
˜
Pj ∩N = G
′′
(δ) Y ∩MPj [G
′′, N, y] ∈ Dα(N)
(in §2 this is called p-proper)
(d) [anti-w.d.] assume i ≤ j ≤ j(∗), α < ℓg(p), N0 ∈ N1 ∈ Eα, N0 ∈
⋃
β<α
Eβ ,
otp(N0∩[i, j)) < α and
2 n < ω, for ℓ < n we have qℓ ∈ Pi is (N1, Pi)-generic
and qℓ forces G
˜
Pi∩N1 = G
ℓ,
∧
ℓ<n
[Gℓ∩N0 = G
∗] where G∗ ⊆ Pi∩N0 is generic
over N0 and Y =:
⋂
ℓ<n
M [Gℓ, N1] ∈ Dα(N) and p ∈ Pj ∩ N0, p ↾ i ∈ G∗.
Then for some G∗∗ ⊆ Pj ∩N0 generic over N0 we have p ∈ G
∗∗ ∈ N1 and∧
ℓ<n
∨
q∈Gℓ
[q  “G∗∗ has an upper bound in Pj/G
˜
Pi”].
Remark. We may like to phrase clause (c) as a condition on each Q
˜
i, for this see
Definition 2.6, 2.8, 2.14; this is a slight loss if we deal with the case i < j, i non
limit ⇒ Pj/Pi is proper. As no need arise here we ignore this.
1.9 Main Claim. Assume Q¯ is a CS iteration, Q¯ ∈ H (χp0) and P(Lim Q¯) ∈
H (χp0)), p a reasonable parameter of length ω1, δ = ℓg(Q¯) is a limit ordinal and for
every α < δ, Q¯ ↾ α is a p−NNR0ℵ0 iteration and p is a a-winner.
Then Q¯ is a p−NNR0ℵ0 iteration.
Proof.
Proof of clause (a) of Definition 1.8:
Trivial.
Proof of clause (b) of Definition 1.8:
Follows from clause (d) of Definition 1.8 proved below.
Proof of clause (d):
Let i, j, α,N0, N1, n, q0, . . . , qn−1, G
ℓ, G∗, p be as in the assumptions of clause (d).
Let α′ = otp(N0 ∩ [i, j)), and α
′ < ω1 so α
′ ∈ N1. If j < j(∗) use “Q¯ ↾ j is a
p−NNR0ℵ0 iteration”, so assume j = j(∗); if i = j the conclusion is trivial so assume
i < j. Let im ∈ N0 ∩ j be such that i0 = i, im < im+1 and 〈im : m < ω〉 ∈ N1 and
2so naturally ℓg(p) = ω1
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⋃
m<ω
im = sup(N0 ∩ j). Choose Mℓ for ℓ < 5 such that y
∗ =: {i, j, α, α′, Q¯, N0, 〈im :
m < ω〉} ∈ Mℓ ∈ Eα′ ∩ N1 ∩
⋂
ℓ<n
M [Gℓ, N1],M0 ∈ M1 ∈ M2 ∈ M3 ∈ M4 and
⋂
ℓ<n
M [Gℓ,M0, y
∗] ∈ Dα(M0).
Now for ℓ < n we can choose q′ℓ ∈ G
ℓ ∩M4 which forces (for Pi0 = Pi) a value to
G
˜
Pi0
∩M3 which necessarily is G
ℓ ∩M3 and necessarily q
′
ℓ ≤ qℓ and, of course, q
′
ℓ is
(Mk, Pi0)-generic forcing G
˜
Pi0
∩Mk = G
ℓ∩Mk for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 and G
˜
Pi0
∩N0 = G
∗.
Let 〈I ∗m : m < ω〉 ∈ M0 list the maximal antichains of Pj that belongs to
N0. Now we choose by induction on m < ω, the objects rm, G
∗
m, pm, nm, G
ℓ
m (for
ℓ < nm) and ym such that:
(a) rm ∈ Pim ∩M4
(b) Dom(rm) ⊆ [i, im)
(c) rm+1 ↾ im = rm
(d) q′ℓ∪rm(∈ Pim) is (Mk, Pim)-generic for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 and is (N0, Pim)-generic
(note that q′ℓ, rm have disjoint domains)
(e) for every predense subset I of Pim which belongs to M2, for some finite
J ⊆ I ∩M2 the set J is predense above q′ℓ ∪ rm for each ℓ < n
(f) nm < ω and for ℓ < nm we have:
Gℓm is a subset of Pim ∩M0 generic over M0, G
ℓ
m ∈M1
(g) if ℓ < nm+1 then G
ℓ
m+1 ∩ Pim ∈ {G
k
m : k < nm}
(h) n0 = n,G
ℓ
0 = G
ℓ ∩M0
(i) q′ℓ ∪ rm Pim “G˜ Pim
∩M0 ∈ {G
ℓ
m : ℓ < nm}”
(j) G∗m is a subset of Pim ∩N0 generic over N0
(k) G∗m ⊆ G
ℓ
m for ℓ < nm
(l) pm ∈ Pj ∩N0, pm ↾ im ∈ G
∗
m, pm+1 ∈ I
∗
m, p0 = p, pm ≤ pm+1
(m) Ym =:
⋂
ℓ<nm
M [Gℓm,M0, y
∗] ∈ Dα′(M0) where y
∗ =: {N0, 〈ik : k < ω〉, Q¯, i, j}.
Why is this sufficient?
During the construction above we choose inductively members of M4 and all the
parameters used are from M4, so if we choose a well ordering <
∗ of M4 and always
choose the <∗-first object the construction is determined. Clearly there is such
<∗∈ N1. Now
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(α) r =
⋃
m
rm (i.e. the unique r ∈ Pj satisfying m < ω ⇒ r ↾ im = rm) belongs
to Pj and to N1,
(β) G∗∗ = {p′ ∈ Pj ∩ N0 :
∨
m<ω
[p′ ≤ pm]} belongs to M4 and is a subset of
Pj ∩N0 generic over N0,
(by the choice of 〈I ∗m : m < ω〉 and clause (k)) and q
′
ℓ ∪ r is above G
∗∗
(in Pj).
So we are done.
Why can we carry out the construction?
For m = 0 there is no problem. So assume we have it for m and we shall choose
for m+ 1.
Stage A: Choose pm+1 ∈ N0 ∩I ∗m such that pm ≤ pm+1 and pm+1 ↾ im ∈ G
∗
m.
No problem.
Stage B: Choose G∗m+1 ⊆ Pim+1 ∩ N0 generic over N0, G
∗
m ⊆ G
∗
m+1 ∈ M0, pm+1 ↾
im+1 ∈ G
∗
m+1 and
∧
ℓ<nm
∨
r∈Gℓm
[r Pim “G
∗
m+1 has an upper bound in Pim+1/G
˜
Pim
].
This is easy by “Q¯ ↾ im+1 is a p−NNR
0
ℵ0
iteration” applied with im, im+1, α
′, pm+1 ↾
im, G
∗
m, 〈G
ℓ
m : ℓ < nm〉, N0,M0 here standing for i, j, α, p, G
∗, 〈Gℓ : ℓ < n〉, N0, N1
there (i.e. we use clause (d) of the Definition 1.8); we are using otp(N0∩[im, im+1)) <
otp(N0 ∩ [im, j)) = α
′.
Stage C:
Now G
˜
Pim
∩M1 is a Pim -name of an object from V (as Pim is proper not adding
reals), so I =: {p ∈ Pim : p forces a value to G
˜
Pim
∩M1(∈ V )} is a dense open
subset of Pim and I ∈ M2. By clause (e) in the induction hypothesis there is a
finite J ⊆ I ∩M2 such that: ℓ < n ⇒ J is predense above q′ℓ ∪ rm. Without
loss of generality J is minimal. Let nm+1 = |J |.
Let J = {pℓm : ℓ < nm+1} let p
ℓ
m  “G
˜
Pim
∩M1 = H
ℓ
m”. So H
ℓ
m ∈ M2, and
as J is minimal, Hℓm ∩ M0 ∈ {G
ℓ
m : ℓ < nm} so let H
ℓ
m ∩ M0 = G
h(ℓ)
m where
h : nm+1 → nm.
Let Y =:
⋂
ℓ<mn
M [Gℓm,M0, y
∗] ∈ Dα′(M0).
Now we choose by induction on ℓ ≤ nm+1 a condition r
ℓ
m ∈M1 such that:
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(α) rℓm ∈ Pim+1 ∩M1, r
ℓ
m ↾ im ∈ H
ℓ
m
(β) rℓm is (M0, Pim)-generic and force a value to G
˜
Pim
∩M0 called G
ℓ
m+1
(γ) rℓm is above G
∗
m+1 (chosen in the previous stage), moreover above p
h(ℓ)
m
(δ) Y ∩
⋂
k<ℓ
M [Gkm+1,M0, y
∗] ∈ Dα′(M0).
For the induction step, apply clause (c) in Definition 1.8 (as Q¯ ↾ im+1 is a
p−NNR0ℵ0-iteration) with im, im+1, α
′,M0, large enough member of H
ℓ
m, p
h(ℓ)
m ,
Y ℓm = Y ∩
⋂
k<ℓ
M [Gkm+1,M0, y
∗] here standing for i, j, α,N, q, p, Y there, noting
Y ℓm ∈M1.
Stage D:
We can choose rm+1 as required such that {r
ℓ
m : ℓ < nm+1} is predense over it
by [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,2.6] (can first do it for each rℓm separately and then put them
together).
So we have finished proving clause (d).
Proof of clause (c).
We prove this by induction on α.
Let i, j, α,N, p, q, Y be as there. If j < j(∗) we can apply “Q ↾ j is a p −NNR0ℵ0
iteration”, so without loss of generality j = j(∗). If i = j the statement is trivial
so assume i < j. Choose in for n < ω such that i0 = i, in ∈ N ∩ j, in < in+1 and⋃
n<ω
in = sup(j ∩N). Let 〈(yn, βn) : n < ω〉 list the pairs (y, β) ∈ N × (α∩N) such
that y ∈ H (χpβ). Let St be a winning strategy for the chooser in the game aα(N).
Let 〈In : n < ω〉 list the dense open subsets of Pj which belongs to N .
Now we choose by induction on n < ω, the objects qn, p
˜
m,M
˜
n, Y
˜
m such that:
(a) qn ∈ Pin , q0 = q
(b) qn is (N,Pin)-generic
(c) qn+1 ↾ in = qn
(d) p
˜
n is a Pin -name of a member of (Pj/G
˜
Pin
) ∩N
(e) p
˜
n is forced to belong to In
(f) M
˜
n is a Pin -name of a member of Eβn ∩N
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(g) if Gj ⊆ Pj is generic over V, qn ∈ Gj , p
˜
n[Gj ∩Pin ] ∈ Gj ,M = M
˜
n[Gj ], then
(α) Gj ∩M is a subset of Q ∩M generic over M
(β) M [Gj ∩M,M, y
∗] ∩ Y ∈ Dβn [M ]
(γ) p
˜
n[Gj ] belongs to M
(h) 〈Ym ∩ M [G
˜
im ,M
˜
m, y
∗], Y
˜
m, Pim ,M
˜
m : m ≤ n〉 is forced by qn to be an
initial segment of a play of the game aα(N) in which the chooser uses the
fixed winning strategy St.
The proof is straight by the induction hypothesis on β and “Q¯ ↾ in is a p−NNR
0
ℵ0
-
iteration” remembering that M
˜
n, Y
˜
n are Pin -names but of objects in V .
Alternatively, see more in the proof in §4 or see below. 1.9
1.10 Remark. 1) We could have used the “adding no reals” and clause (d) in the
proof of clause (c) in order to weaken “winner” to “not loser”; also we can use
a′α(N,N
′, P ), see §4. Also the “N0 ∈
⋃
β<α
Eβ” can be replaced by “N0 ∈ E ′0” with
E ′0 ⊆ [H (χ
p
0)]
ℵ0 stationary; also we can put extra restrictions on G∗ (and G∗∗),
e.g. M [G∗, N0, y∗] large.
2) Of course, the use of 〈χα : α < ℓg(p)〉 is not really necessary, we could have used
subsets of P(Pℓg(Q¯)), (so Eα is changed accordingly) as all the properties depend
just on Nℓ ∩P(Pℓg(Q¯)). We feel the present way is more transparent.
3) The proof of clause (c) being preserved can be applied to Q¯ satisfying (a) + (c)
of Definition 1.8 (so possibly adding reals), but then we have to replace Dα(N) by
a definition of such pseudo filters with the winning strategy being absolute enough,
e.g. for standard D¯.
4) We can also replace Dα(a) by a partial ordered set Lα(a) and a function va :
Lα(a)→ P(a) (i.e. by (La, va)).
5) In the case we adopt remark (3), then remark (1) (non-losing) becomes less clear,
as the universe changes during the proof. We may consider to weaken “the chooser
has a winning strategy” in a′α(N) (game depends on D¯), e.g. to not losing in a
game with finitely many boards, possibly splitting in each move (no real novelty in
the proof), but it is not clear how interesting this is. But if Dα(N) is inductively
defined as sums over an ultrafilter (which is preserved), it just seems that not losing
is enough.
1.11 Definition. Q¯ a CS iteration will be called p-proper if clauses (a) + (c) of
Definition 1.8 holds.
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1.12 Question: Is this notion of interest in iterations adding reals?
1.13 Definition. Let κ ∈ [2, ω]. We say that Q¯ is a p−NNR0κ-iteration if: from
Definition 1.8 we have:
(a) as there
(b) as there
(c) [long properness] as there
(d) [κ-anti w.d.] as in (d) there but 1 + n < κ and N0 ∈ E0.
1.14 Main Claim. Assume 2 ≤ κ < ω, Q¯ is a CS iteration, P(Lim(Q¯)) ⊆
H (χp0), p a reasonable parameter of length ω1 which is a non-a
′-loser, δ = ℓg(Q¯) a
limit ordinal and i < δ ⇒ Q¯ ↾ i is a p−NNRκ-iteration. Then Q¯ is a p−NNR
0
κ-
iteration.
Remark. 1) As it is just combining the proof of 1.9 and [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§2] (or
[Sh:b, Ch.VIII,4.10]-[Sh:f, Ch.VIII,4.10]) we elaborate less.
2) See more in §4.
Proof. Similar to the proof of 1.9, with some changes (as in [Sh:b, Ch.VIII,§4],
[Sh:f, Ch.VIII,§4], [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,2.10C]). During the proof of clause (d) we add
to clauses (a)-(m):
(n) nm is a power of 2, say 2
n∗m and so we can rename {Gℓm : ℓ < nm} as
{Gηm : η ∈
n∗m2}
(o)
(α) Mη ∈ M1 ∩ Eβη for η ∈
(n∗m≥)2 where j0 = otp([i, j) ∩ N0) and if
η = νˆ < i > then jη = otp([i, j) ∩Mν)
(β) M<> = N0
(γ) Mη ∈Mηˆ〈0〉 ∩Mηˆ〈1〉
(δ) η ⊳ ν1 ∈
n∗m2 & η ⊳ ν2 ∈
n∗m2 ⇒ Gν1m ∩Mη = G
ν2
m ∩Mη so we call it
Kηm
(ε) Mηˆ〈0〉 =Mηˆ〈1〉 when η ∈
n∗m2 call it Nη
(ζ) Nη ∈ Eℓg(η) for η ∈
(m∗m>)2
(η) Y ηm = M [K
ηˆ〈0〉
m , Nη] ∩M [K
ηˆ〈1〉
m , Nη] ∈ Djηˆ<0>(Nη).
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1.14
1.15 Conclusion. Let Q¯ be a CS iteration and p a non-a′-loser reasonable param-
eter, 2 ≤ n(∗) ≤ ℵ0, ℓg(p) = ω1.
Then Q¯ is a p−NNR0
n(∗)-iteration iff for each i < ℓg(Q¯)
(∗)i Q
˜
i is a proper forcing and Pi, Q
˜
i satisfies clauses (d) + (c) of the Definition
“p−NNR0n(∗)-iteration” with i, i+ 1 here standing for i, j there.
Proof. By induction on j = ℓg(Q¯). For j = 0 there is nothing, for j limit use 1.9
(or 1.14) and if j successor just read the definitions. 1.15
We point out here that clause (c) of Definitions 1.8 and 1.13 really follows from
earlier properties which play parallel roles.
1.16 Claim. 1) Assume that p is a standard reasonable parameter, and is standard
and α < ℓg(p), N ∈ E pα , Y ∈ Dα(N) and δ ≤ ω1 ∩N a limit ordinal.
Then we can find sequences N¯ = 〈Ni : i < δ〉, 〈γi : i < δ〉 such that:
(a) Ni ∈ N (for i < δ) is countable, N ∩ α ⊆ Ni and Ni ∈ Y
(b) Ni ⊆
⋃
β∈α∩N
(H (χpβ),∈), and β ∈ α ∩Ni ⇒ Ni ↾ H (χ
p
β) ≺ (H (χ
p
β),∈)
(c) i < j ⇒ Ni ⊆ Nj
(d) for i limit Ni =
⋃
j<i
Nj and N ∩
⋃
{H (χpβ) : β ∈ α ∩ N} =
⋃
j<δ
Nj so we
can stipulate Nδ = N
(e) β ∈ α ∩N ⇒ 〈H (χpβ) ∩Nj : j ≤ i〉 ∈ Ni+1
(f) γi ∈ Ni ∩ α,Ni ∩H (χ
p
γi
) ∈ Eγi ∩ Y, γ¯ ↾ (i+ 1) ∈ Ni+1
(g) if i ≤ δ is a limit ordinal, (i = δ & β ∈ α ∩Ni) ∨ (i < δ & β ∈ γi ∩Ni)
(so β ∈ H (χpβ)) and y ∈ H (χ
p
β), then for some j < i, γj = β, y ∈ Nj.
Moreover
(g)+ if i ≤ δ is a limit ordinal, then {Nj ∩ H (χpγj ) : j < i and γj < γi} ∈
Dγi(N) = Dγi(N ∩H (χ
p
γi
))
(h) if δ < N ∩ ω1 then δ ∈ N0, if δ = N ∩ ω1 then i < δ ⇒ i ∈ Ni.
2) If p is a standard, reasonable parameter, Q¯ is a CS iteration, ℓg(Q¯) = α+1, Q¯ ↾ α
is p−NNR0k(∗)-iteration and
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Pα “Q
˜
α is proper and (<
+ ω1)-proper”, then trying to apply 1.14 for Q¯, clauses
(a),(c) (called p-proper in Definition 2.3 below) holds.
3) If ℓg(p) = ω1, then in part (2) it suffices to ask Pi “α < ω1 ⇒ Q
˜
i is α-proper”,
that is Pi “Q
˜
i is (< ω1)-proper”.
Proof. 1) By induction on β ∈ (α ∩N) ∪ {α} we prove that there is
〈Nj : j < β ∩N〉 ∈ N satisfying the relevant requirements.
2) By Definition of (< ω1)-proper, ifGα ⊆ Pα is generic over α, Y =: M [Gα, N, y∗] ∈
Dα(N), let 〈Ni : i < δ〉 be as in (1) for δ = N ∩ ω1, without loss of generality
p ∈ N0 ∩ Q
˜
α[Gα], let q ≥ p be (Ni, Q
˜
α[Gα])-generic for every i < δ (formally look
at N¯ ′ = 〈N ′i : i < δ〉, N
′
i = Ni ↾ H (χ
p
0) and apply to it the (< ω1)-proper).
3) Follows as α ∈ N ⇒ δ = ωα ∈ N ∩ ω1. 1.16
1.17 Discussion: 1) This includes as special cases [Sh:b, Ch.V,§5,§7]. There is no
direct comparison with [Sh:b, Ch.VIII,§4], [Sh:f, Ch.VIII,§4], but we can make the
notion somewhat more complicated, to include the theorem there in our context,
i.e., what is not included is a generalization there not really needed for the examples
discussed there (see here in §3 below). The condition there involves having many
sequences 〈Nα : α ≤ δ〉 such that if p0, p1 ∈ P, pℓ is (Ni, Pα)-generic for i, pℓ 
“G
˜
P ∩ N0 = G
∗”, then there is G′ ⊆ Gen(Q
˜
i[G
∗], N0[G
∗]), G′ ∈ N0, Pi 1Pi “G
˜
0
has no bound in Q
˜
α”. This speaks on a family of sequences from [H (χ)]
ℵ0 rather
than members.
2) For [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§2], the comparison is not so easy. Our problem is to “carry”
good (N,Pi, 〈Gℓ : ℓ < n〉), Gℓ ∈ Gen(N,Pi) with a bound, such that we can “in-
crease i” and we can find N ′, y ∈ N ′ ∈ N,N ′ ≺ N such that (N ′, Pi, 〈Gi ∩ N :
ℓ < n〉) is good enough. In [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII] we are carrying genericity in some
Pα¯, α¯ ∈ trind(i), here much less. But what we need is the implication “if (N,Pi, G¯)
is good we can extend it to good (N,Pi+1, G¯
′)”, so making good weaker generates
an incomparable notion and clearly there are other variants. We can consider other
such notions (see §5).
2A)We can give alternative proofs of consistency of the questions in [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§1]
by the present iteration theorem (see §3 below).
3) We can in 1.16(2) weaken the assumption “(< ω1)-proper” to things of the
form: if N¯ = 〈Ni ≤ δ〉, p ∈ Q ∩ N0, Q ∈ N0 then there is q ≥ p such that
q  “for many i < δ,G
˜
Q ∩ Ni ∈ Gen(Ni, Q)”. In particular the condition applies
to the forcing notions considered in [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§1].
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§2 Delayed properness
In this section we prove little, but the notions introduced are used in §3, §4. We
concentrate here on simple parameters so the reader may assume it all the time.
We give two versions, the simpler one is version 2 for which simplicity is a very
natural demand.
2.1 Observation. 1) Assume
(a) χ¯ = 〈χα : α < α
∗〉 increases fast enough, so
⋃
β<α
H (χβ) ∈ H (χα)
(b) Eα ⊆ {N : N a countable elementary submodel of (H (χα),∈)}
is stationary
(c) Rα ∈ H (χα) and N ∈ Eα implies
〈χβ : β < α〉 ∈ N, 〈Rβ : β ≤ α〉 ∈ N and 〈Eβ : β < α〉 ∈ N .
Then there is a standard reasonable parameter p with ℓg(p) = α∗, E pα = Eα,
Rpα = Rα (and D¯
p standard).
2) If in addition clause (d) below hold, then p is a simple standard reasonable
parameter where
(d) β ∈ N ∈ Eα, β < α⇒ N ∩H (χβ) ∈ Eβ .
3) If χα = (i2α+1)
+ for α < α∗, Rα ∈ H (χα), then χα increases fast enough. If
〈χα : α < α
∗〉, 〈Rα : α < α
∗〉 are as in part (1), χ ≤ χ0, E ⊆ [H (χ)]≤ℵ0 stationary
and we let Eα = {N : N a countable elementary submodel of (H (χα),∈) and
〈χβ : β < α〉, 〈Rβ : β ≤ α〉, E belong to N and N ∩ H (χ) ∈ E }, then the
assumptions of parts (1) and (2) above holds (hence their conclusions).
Proof. Straight.
2.2 Definition. Let p be a reasonable parameter and α ≤ β < ℓg(p).
1) For N ∈ Eβ such that α ∈ N we define a game aα,β(N) = aα,β(N, p) as follows.
A play lasts ω-moves. In the n-th move:
(a) the challenger chooses Xn ∈ Dβ(N) such that
m < n⇒ Xn ⊆ Xm
(b) the chooser chooses αn ∈ α ∩N
(c) the challenger chooses β′n ∈ β ∩N and y
′
n ∈ N ∩H (χ
p
αn
)
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(d) the chooser chooses βn ∈ β ∩ N\β
′
n and Mn ∈ Xn ∩ Eβn and yn ∈ Mn ∩
H (χpαn) satisfying αn ≤ βn, y
′
n ∈ Mn, αn ∈ Mn and Yn ∈ Dβn(Mn) such
that Yn ⊆ Xn and Yn ∈ N
(e) the challenger chooses M ′n ∈ Yn ∩ Eαn ∩ (Mn ∪ {Mn ∩H (χ
p
αn
)}) satisfying
yn, y
′
n ∈ M
′
n and chooses Zn ∈ Dαn(M
′
n) = Dαn(M
′
n ∩H (χ
p
αn
)) such that
Zn ⊆ Yn.
In the end the chooser wins the play if
⋃
{Zn ∪ {M
′
n} : n < ω} ∈ D
+
α (N) (= D
+
α (N ∩H (χ
p
α)))
1A) We call aα,β(N) = aα,β(N, p) version 1; version 2 means that in clause (e) we
add the requirement M ′n = Mn ∩H (χ
p
αn
) and in clause (d) we require αn ≤p βn.
If we do not mention the version it means that it holds for both.
2) Assume N ∈ N ′ ≺ (H (χ),∈). We define a game a′α,β(N,N
′, p) similarly but
replace a) - e) by
(a)′ the challenger chooses Xn ∈ Dβ(N) such that m < n⇒ Xn ⊆ X
′
m
(b)′ the chooser chooses αn ∈ α ∩N and X
′
n ⊆ Xn such that X
′
n ∈ Dβ(N)
(c)′ like (c)
(d)′ like (d) but we replace “Yn ∈ N” by “Yn ∈ N
′”
(e)′ like (e) but add Zn ∈ N
′.
Note: so every proper initial segment of a play belongs to N ′.
2.3 Definition. Let p be a reasonable parameter.
1) For α ≤ β < ℓg(p) we say p is an aα,β-winner [non-aα,β-loser] when for some
x ∈ H (χpβ) we have:
if {x, α} ∈ N ∈ Eβ , then the chooser wins the game aα,β(N, p) [the chal-
lenger does not win in the game aα,β(N, p)].
2) We can replace aα,β by a
′
α,β.
3) For any function f : ℓg(p) → P(ℓg(p)) we can replace α, β by f meaning: for
every α < ℓg(p) and β ∈ f(α), we have p is a aα,β-winner.
4) Let F p be the family of functions from ℓg(p) to P(ℓg(p)) such that for each
α < ℓg(p), f(α) is a nonempty subset of [α, ℓg(p)). Let F pclub be the set of f ∈ F
p
such that for each α < ℓg(p), f(α) is a club of ℓg(p). Let F pend be the set of f ∈ F
p
such that for each α < ℓg(p), f(α) is an end segment of ℓg(p), we then may identify
f(α) with Min(f(α)).
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5) We call f decreasing continuous if α1 < α2 < ℓg(p) ⇒ f(α2) ⊆ f(α1) and for
limit α < ℓg(p) we have f(α) =
⋂
γ<α
f(γ). Let f ≤ g mean (∀α < ℓg(p))(g(α) ⊆
f(α)).
There are obvious monotonicity properties.
2.4 Claim. Assume p is a reasonable parameter.
1) If α ≤p α
′, α′ ≤ α ≤ β = β′ < ℓg(p), and p is a aα,β-winner, then it is aα′,β′-
winner. Similarly for a′-winner, non-a-loser, non-a′-loser.
2) If p is a aα,β-winner, then p is a a
′
α,β-winner and a non-aα,β-loser. If p is a
a′α,β-winner or non-aα,β-loser, then p is non-a
′
α,β-loser.
3) Assume f, g ∈ F p and f ≤ g. If p is a af -winner [or a
′
f -winner] [ or non-af -
loser] [or non-af -loser], then p is a ag-winner [or a
′
g-winner] [or non-ag-loser] [or
non-a′g-loser].
Proof. Straight (we are using the simplicity of p).
2.5 Claim. 1) Assume p is a standard reasonable parameter. Then p is a winner
(see Definition 1.5).
2) If p is a reasonable parameter and it is a winner, then p is a aα,α-winner.
3) If p is a reasonable parameter and it is a winner and α ≤ β < ℓg(p) then p is a
aα,β-winner (hence af -winner for f as in 2.3(3)).
4) Similarly with a′-winner, a′α,β winner and/or with the “non loser” cases.
Proof. Straight.
2.6 Definition. 1) Let p be a reasonable parameter and P be a proper forcing
notion not adding reals, P(P ) ∈ H (χp0) and GP ⊆ P is generic over V .
Then we interpret p in V P as p′ = pV [G], or we may write pP defined as follows:
(a) χp
′
α = χ
p
α
(b) Rp
′
α = 〈Rα, P, GP 〉
(c) E p
′
α = {N [GP ] : N ∈ Eα and P ∈ N and N [GP ] ∩ V = N}
(d) Dα(N [GP ]) =
{
{M [GP ] ∈ Eα :M ∈ Y ∩
⋃
β<α
E pβ } : Y ∈ Dα(N)
}
.
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2.7 Claim. Let p, P be as in Definition 1.8.
1) In Definition 2.6, pV [GP ] is a reasonable parameter in V [GP ].
2) If p is, in V , a a-winner (or non-a-loser or a′-winner or non-a′-loser), then
pV [GP ] is so (in V [GP ]).
3) If p is, in V , a aα,β-winner (or a non aα,β-lower or a
′
α,β-winner or a
′
α,β-non
loser), then pV [GP ] is so in V [Gp].
Proof. Straight (we use P is a proper forcing notion not adding reals).
∗ ∗ ∗
2.8 Definition. Let p be a reasonable parameter.
1) For α ≤ β < ℓg(p), we say a forcing notion Q is (p, α, β)-proper if:
(P(Q) ∈ H (χp0) and):
(∗) for some x ∈ H (χβ) if N ∈ Eβ , {x,Q, α} ∈ N, p ∈ N ∩Q and
Y ∈ Dα(N), then for some q we have:
(a) p ≤ q ∈ Q
(b) q is (N,Q)-generic
(c) version (1): for some N ′ ∈ (Eα ∩ N ∩ Y ) ∪ {N ∩ H (χ
p
α)} satisfying
α = β ⇒ N ′ = N we have q Q “M [G
˜
Q, N
′, y∗]∩Y ∈ Dα(N
′)” where
y∗ = 〈x, p, Q〉 hence necessarily q is (N ′, Q)-generic.
(Version 2: similarly but N ′ = N ↾ H (χpα) and naturally
we demand α ≤p β).
2) We say Q is (p, f)-proper if (p, f are as above and) for every α < ℓg(p) and
β ∈ f(α) we have Q is (p, α, β)-proper.
3) We say Q is p-proper if Q is (p, α, α)-proper for α < ℓg(p). We say Q is almost
p-proper if Q is (p, f)-proper for some f ∈ F p (as above).
2.9 Claim. Assume p is a simple reasonable parameter.
1) If α′ ≤ α ≤ β ≤ β′ < ℓg(p) (for version 2 we demand α′ ≤p β
′ and α ≤p β) and
Q is as (p, α, β)-proper forcing notion, then Q is a (p, α′, β′)-proper forcing notion.
2) Assume f, f ′ are in F p and f ≤ f ′. If Q is a (p, f)-proper forcing notion, then
Q is a (p, f ′)-proper forcing notion.
Proof. Straight.
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2.10 Discussion: We may like to consider (p, f)-proper for iterations which may add
reals. Then we have to replace Dα(N) by a definition which is absolute enough,
(and the non-loser versions have to be absolute enough).
It is natural to restrict ourselves to p-closed Y , see below.
2.11 Definition. Let p be a simple reasonable parameter and N ∈ Eα. Now
Y ⊆ N is called p-closed if (see 3.9):
(a) Y ⊆ N ∩
⋃
β<α
Eβ
(b) if M ∈ N ∩ Eβ and β < α (hence β ∈ α ∩M ⊆ α ∩ N) and γ ∈ M ∩ β
and M ∩H (χpγ) ∈ Eγ (this requirement is redundant if p is simple or just
γ ≤p β),
then M ∩H (χpγ) ∈ Y ⇔M ∈ Y
(c) if β < α,Mℓ ∈ N ∩ Eβ (hence β ∈ α ∩ N) and Mℓ ⊆ Mℓ+1 for ℓ < ω and
M =
⋃
ℓ<ω
Mℓ ∈ N ∩ Eβ, and even 〈Mℓ : ℓ < ω〉 ∈ N , then
∧
ℓ
Mℓ ∈ Y ⇒
M ∈ Y .
We may consider
2.12 Definition. Let p be a reasonable parameter and Ξ ⊆ {(α, β) : α ≤ β <
ℓg(p)} and we understand N ∈ Eα ⇒ Ξ∩ ((α+ 1)× (α+ 1) ∈ N) and let αp(N) =
the α such that N ∈ E pα if it exists.
We say Q¯ is an (κ1,Ξ)-anti w.d.-iteration for p as in clauses (a), (b), (d) of
Definitions 1.8, 1.13 only we replace clause (d) by
(d)Ξ [(κ,Ξ)-anti w.d.] like old clause (d) but for some (α, β) ∈ Ξ, N0 ∈ N1
are countable elementary submodels of (H (χ),∈), p ∈ N0, N0 ∩ H (χ
p
α) ∈
Eα, N1 ∩H (χ
p
β) ∈ Eβ, α ∈ N0, β ∈ N1 and the rest as before.
We omit “for p” if p is clear from the context.
2.13 Lemma. Let p be a reasonable parameter.
1) If Ξ 6= ∅ and Q¯ is an NNR0ℵ0,Ξ-iteration, then Pℓg(Q¯) = Lim(Q¯) does not add
reals and is (p,Ξ)-proper.
Proof. Easy.
As the sets H (χα) may change with forcing, we may prefer to use Eα ⊆ [χα]≤ℵ0 ,
for this we define:
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2.14 Definition. 1) We call p an o.b. (ordinal based) parameter if
p = (χ¯p, R¯p, E¯ p, D¯p) and for some ordinal α∗ called ℓg(p) we have:
(a) χ¯ = 〈χα : α < α
∗〉, χα is a regular cardinal and H
(
(
⋃
β<α
χβ)
+
)
∈ H (χα)
(b) R¯ = 〈Rα : α < α
∗〉, Rα an n(Rα)-place relation on some bounded subset of
χα (we could have asked “on χα”, no real difference)
(c) E¯ = 〈Eα : α < α
∗〉, Eα ⊆ [χα]
≤ℵ0 is stationary
(d) D¯ = 〈Dα : α < α
∗〉 and Dα is a function with domain Eα and for each
a ∈ Eα, Dα(a) is a family of subsets of a, closed under supersets, non-empty
if α > 0 (let D−α (a) = (Dα(a))
− = P(a)\Dα(a))
(e) let p[α] = 〈χ¯ ↾ α, R¯ ↾ (α+ 1), E¯ ↾ α, D¯ ↾ α〉
(f) if a ∈ Eα and X ⊆ P(a), then:
X ∈ Dα(a)⇔ X ∩
⋃
β<α
Eβ ∈ Dα(a).
2) We say that an o.b. parameter p is simple if
(g) if a ∈ Eα and X ∈ Dα(a) and β ∈ α ∩ a, then a ∩ χβ ∈ Eβ .
3) For p as above let q =: pV be defined by
α∗,q = α∗,p
and we define by induction on α < α∗,p:
χqα = χ
p
α
Rqα = R
p
α
E qα = {N ≺ (H (χ
q
α),∈) : N is countable, N ∩ χ
p
α ∈ E
p
α , q
[α] ∈ N}
(note that q[α] is well defined by the induction hypothesis)
Dqα(N) =
{
Y ′ :Y ′ ⊆
⋃
β<α
E qβ and for some y ∈ N ∩
⋃
β<α
H (χpβ)
and Y ∈ Dpα(N ∩ χ
p
α) we have
Y ′ ⊇ {M :M ∈ N ∩
⋃
β<α
E qβ and y ∈M and M ∩ χ
p
α ∈ Y }
}
.
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4) For such p we say Q¯ is a NNR0κ-iteration for p if it is an NNR
0
κ-iteration for
pV . We say p is simple if pV is.
Similarly for a-winner, non-a-loser, etc.
2.15 Claim. Assume p is an o.b. [simple] parameter in the universe V .
1) If P ∈ H (χp0) is a proper forcing notion (or at least preserve the stationarity of
E pα for each α < ℓg(p)), then P “p is an o.b. [simple] parameter”.
2) If forcing with P adds no reals, then also a-winner, non-a-loser, etc., are
preserved.
3) pV is a reasonable parameter.
2.16 Definition. Let p be an o.b. parameter.
1) We say Q is an NNR0κ-forcing for p or a p − NNR
0
κ-forcing notion when: (Q
is a forcing notion in a universe V and) if for some transitive class V0, p ∈ V0 and
NNR0κ-iteration Q¯ = 〈Pi, Q
˜
j : i ≤ α, j < α〉, we have V
Pα
0 = V , then we can let
Q
˜
α = Q and get Q¯
′, an NNR0κ-iteration (i.e. V = V0[Gα], Gα ⊆ Pα is generic over
V0 and there is a Pα-name Q
˜
α such that 〈Pi, Q
˜
i : i ≤ α〉 is an NNR
0
κ- iteration
and Q = Q
˜
α[Gα]). In particular Q is proper and does not add reals.
2) If we omit “for p” we mean for any p which makes sense. Alternatively, we can
put a family of p’s.
3) We add “over x” if this holds whenever x ∈ V0. We can use the same definition
for other versions of NNR.
4) Axαλ(p, κ, 0) means: if Q is an ℵ2-e.c.c. (see [Sh:f, Ch.VII,§1]), (ℵ2-pic if λ = ℵ2;
see [Sh:f, Ch.VIII,§2]), an NNR0κ-forcing notion for p,Iβ a dense open subset of
Q for β < β∗ < λ and S
˜
i is a Qi-name of a stationary subset of ω1 for i < i
∗ < α,
then for some directed G ⊆ Q we have:
β < β∗ ⇒ G ∩Iβ 6= ∅, S
˜
i[G] = {γ < ω1 : (∃r ∈ G)(r Q “γ ∈ S
˜
i”)} is a stationary
subset of ω1.
Now we can deduce conclusions on preservation of being anNNR0κ-forcing notion
for p and consistency of axioms.
2.17 Conclusion. 1) if p is o.b. parameter, non-a′id-loser, ℓg(p) = ω1 and Q¯ is an
CS iteration such that α < ℓg(Q¯)⇒Pα “Q
˜
α is an NNR
0
κ-forcing notion for
p”, then Q¯ is an NNR0κ-iteration for p (note 1.9 applies).
2) Assume CH + µ = µ<µ ≥ λ, if p is a non−a′id-loser o.b. parameter, χ
p
0 > 2
λ,
then for some ℵ2-e.c.c., (if λ = ℵ2,ℵ2-pic) NNR
0
κ-forcing notion P, |P | = µ we have
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P “Axλ(p, κ, 0)”.
3) The parallel of 1.15 holds.
Proof. Straight.
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§3 Examples: shooting a thin club
We would like here to see how some examples fit our framework. We already
know that (< ω1)-proper forcings are p-proper (by 1.16). We first deal with a
forcing notion for which the κ (in NNRxκ) is < ℵ0 (in Definition 3.1). Second, we
deal with shooting clubs of ω1 running away from some Cδ ⊆ δ = sup(Cδ) which are
small (see [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§1]). Those are the most natural non-ω-proper forcing
notions not adding reals, (though this may depend on the set theory).
The prototype for [Sh:b, Ch.VIII,§4], [Sh:f, Ch.VIII,§4] is 3.1(1) below.
3.1 Definition. 1) Let C¯ = 〈(Cδ, nδ) : δ < ω1 limit〉 where Cδ is an unbounded
subset of δ of order type ω and 1 ≤ nδ < ω (e.g. nδ = 1). Let u¯ = 〈uδ : δ <
ω1 limit〉, where uδ ∈ [2nδ + 1]
nδ , (if nδ = 1, then uδ = {kδ}, kδ ∈ {0, 1, 2}). Then
we define
Q = QC¯,u¯ =
{
f : for some α < ω1, f is a function from α
to ω such that for every limit ordinal δ ≤ α,
for some k < 2nδ + 1, k /∈ uδ and for every
i ∈ Cδ large enough we have f(i) = k
}
ordered by inclusion.
2) Assume C¯ = 〈Cδ : δ < ω1 limit〉, Cδ a closed subset of δ of order type < ω×δ and
for δ1 < δ2 limit, sup(Cδ1 ∩ Cδ2) < δ1, and for limit δ
∗ we have {Cδ ∩ δ
∗ : δ < ω1}
is countable. Assume further κ¯ = 〈κδ : δ < ω1 limit〉, κδ ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,ℵ0}, D¯ = 〈Dδ :
δ < ω1〉, Dδ is a family of subsets of Dom(Dδ), such that the intersection of any
< κδ of them is non-empty.
Let f¯ = 〈fδ,x : δ < ω1, x ∈ Dom(Dδ)〉 satisfy fδ,x : Cδ → ω and
A¯ = 〈Aδ : δ < ω1〉 satisfy Aδ ∈ Dδ. Then we define Q = QC¯,D¯,κ¯,f¯ ,A¯ as
{
f : for some α < ω1, f is a function from α to ω
such that for every limit δ ≤ ω for some
x ∈ Aδ we have fδ,x ⊆
∗ f i.e. for every large enough
i ∈ Cδ we have fδ,x(i) = f(i)
}
ordered by inclusion.
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3.2 Claim. 1) The forcing notion Q from 3.1(1) is proper, does not add reals, and
ia α-proper for α < ω1 and even is (< ω1)-proper, also D-complete for some simple
2-completeness system, hence causes no problem to the demand (d) in Definition
1.9 which means:
(∗) if Q¯ is a CS iteration, ℓg(Q¯) = α + 1, Q¯ ↾ α is NNR02-iteration and Pα
“Q
˜
α = Qc¯,u”, (c¯, u¯) as above ∈ V then Q¯ satisfies demand ((a), (b) and)
(d)) of Definition 1.9.
2) Similarly for the forcing notion Q from 3.1(2).
Proof. 1) See [Sh:b, Ch.VIII,§4] or [Sh:f, Ch.VIII,§4].
2) Similarly.
3.3 Definition. Assume C¯ = 〈Cδ : Cδ < ω1〉, Cδ an unbounded subset of the limit
ordinal δ (think of the case Cδ of order type < δ but not necessarily). Let
QC¯ =
{
c : for some α < ω1, c is a closed subset of α
and for every limit ordinal δ ≤ α we have :
δ = sup(c ∩ δ)⇒ c ∩ Cδ bounded in δ
}
c1 < c2 iff c1 is an initial segment of c2.
Remark. 1) See [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§1], note QC¯ may be not ω-proper. We first deal
with the simple case: otp(Cδ) = ω.
2) Note that c ∈ Qc¯ is a closed subset of α, but not necessarily a closed subset of
ω1.
3.4 Claim. Assume p is a simple reasonable parameter, C¯ as in 3.3,
∧
δ
otp(Cδ) =
ω, let f ∈ F p be f(0) = 0, f(β) = 1 + β, then QC¯ is (p, f)-proper.
We shall prove more in 3.6 below.
3.5 Remark. 1) Note that if
∧
δ
otp(Cδ) < δ, we can split the analysis by, for each
ordinal γ < ω1 such that Sγ = {δ : otp(Cδ) = γ} is stationary, that is restricting
ourselves to {N : N ∩ ω1 ∈ Sγ}.
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3.6 Claim. 1) Assume
(a) p is a simple reasonable parameter
(b) p is non-af -loser, f ∈ F p
(c) γ(∗) < ω1
(d) C¯ = 〈Cδ : δ < ω1〉, Cδ ⊆ δ = sup(Cδ)
(e) otp(Cδ) ≤ ω
γ(∗) for every δ
Define g ∈ F p by g(0) = 0, g(1) = f(1) + γ(∗), g(α+ 1) = f(g(α)) + γ(∗) + 1 (and
necessarily, for limit α, g(α) = sup
β<α
g(β)).
Then for every α < ℓg(p), the forcing notion Q = QC¯ is (p, α, g(α))-proper (version
1).
2) We can in part (1) get “version 2” when: if g(δ) = δ, N ∈ Eα, C ⊆ ω1 ∩ N =
sup(C), otp(C) ≤ ωγ(∗) (for example C = Cα ∩ N for some α) and Y ∈ Dα(N)
then Y ′ = {M ∈ Y :M ∩ ω1 /∈ C} ∈ Dα(N), which is a mild condition.
3) If we weaken clause (b) to (b)f,g below, then for α < ℓg(p), the forcing notion
QC¯ is (p, α, f(γ + α))-proper, where
(b)f,g f ∈ F p and f(f(α)) = f(α) for every α < ℓg(p) and p is a non-a′f -loser.
Proof. First observe
(∗) for each α < ω1 the set I ∗α = {p ∈ QC¯ : there is β ∈ p which is ≥ α} is a
dense subset of Q.
1) Similar to the proof of 2) noting version (2) is harder on the chooser, and using
the extra freedom we can avoid the need for the extra assumption from (2).
2) We prove this by induction on α, let β = g(α).
Let N ∈ Eβ be countable, p ∈ N ∩ QC¯ (and QC¯ , α, β ∈ N) and Y ∈ Dβ(N) be
given. Let δ = δN =: N ∩ ω1.
Case 1: α = 0.
Comprehending the demand in Definition 2.8(1) it just means “QC¯ is proper”.
Let 〈In : n < ω〉 list the dense open subsets of QC¯ that belongs to N and we shall
define by induction on n, a condition pn such that
(i) p0 = p, pn ∈ N
(ii) pn ≤ pn+1 ∈ In
(iii) the set pn+1 ∪ {sup pn+1}\(pn ∪ {sup pn}) is disjoint to Cδ.
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If we succeed to carry out the induction clearly we are done as
⋃
n<ω
pn is as required,
noting for each α < N∩ω1,I ∗α ∈ {In : n < ω}, hence (∃β ∈ (
⋃
n<ω
pn))[α ≤ β < ω1].
Also there is no problem to choose p0. So assume pn has been chosen and we shall
choose pn+1 as required. There is a function Fn ∈ N with domain QC¯ such that:
q ∈ QC¯ ⇒ q ≤ Fn(q) ∈ In.
For α < ω1 let q
[α] = q ∪ {sup(q)} ∪ {sup(q) + 1 + α}, so clearly q ≤ q[α] ∈ QC¯
and the function (q, α) 7→ q[α] belongs to N . Define a function H : ω1 → ω1 by
H(α) = sup(Fn(p
[α]
n )), clearly it is well defined, belongs to N and let C =: {β < ω1 :
β a limit ordinal, moreover ωβ = β and (∀α < β)(H(α) < β) and sup(pn) < β},
so C is a club of ω1 which belongs to N and γ(∗) ∈ N hence we can find β
∗ ∈ C
such that otp(β∗∩C) is divisible by ωγ(∗), but otp(Cδ ∩β
∗) < ωγ(∗) hence for some
β ∈ C we have sup(Cδ ∩ β) < β. Let pn+1 = Fn(p
[sup(Cδ∩β)+1]); it is as required.
Case 2: α = 1.
Easily Y ′ =: {M ∈ Y : M ∩ω1 /∈ Cδ} ∈ Dg(1)(N) as β ≥ g(1) = f(1)+γ(∗), just
prove this by induction on γ(∗). Let 〈In : n < ω〉 list the dense open subsets of
QC¯ which belong to N and let δ =
⋃
n<ω
αn and αn < αn+1 < δ. We now simulate
a strategy for the challenger in the game aα,β(N), together with choosing in the
n-th move, (in the end of it) also the challenger chooses pn+1 ∈ QC¯ ∩N such that
p0 = p, pn ≤ pn+1 ∈ In and during the play letting Zn = ∅ (in fact also the
chooser has to use Yn = ∅) and pn+1 is (Mn, QC¯)-generic and sup(pn+1) > αn and
the set (pn+1 ∪ {sup pn+1})\(pn ∪ {sup pn}) is disjoint to Cδ. This is possible by
Case 1 and its proof because Mn ∩ ω1 /∈ Cδ which holds as Mn ∈ Y
′. As this is
a legal strategy for the challenger, so it cannot be a winning strategy hence for
some such play the chooser wins hence {Mn : n < ω} ∈ D1(N), remember α = 1.
Now q =
⋃
n<ω
pn is well defined, and sup(q) = δ and q ∩ Cδ ⊆ p ∪ {sup(p)} and
q QC¯ “{Mn : n < ω} ⊆ M [G˜ QC¯
, N ]”, so q is as required as the chooser has won
the play.
Case 3: α > 1, α successor.
Similar to Case 2 only we use the induction hypothesis instead of using Case 1.
Case 4: α a limit ordinal.
Similar to Case 2.
Easy. 3.6
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3.7 Definition. 1) Assume
(a) S ⊆ ω1 is stationary
(b) f ∈ ω1(ω1)
(c) C¯ = 〈Cδ : δ < ω1〉
(d) Cδ is an unbounded subset of δ.
We define when “C¯ obeys f on S” for f ∈ ω1ω1 a (Dω1 + S, γ)-th function (see
part (2)) by induction on γ. For f being (Dω1 + S, γ)-function, γ < ω1 this means
{δ ∈ S : otp(Cδ) ≤ ω
1+f(δ)} = S mod Dω1 . In general it means that for some
g : ω1 → ω1 and pressing down function on h on S, for every ζ < ω1 for which
h−1{ζ} is stationary, for some β < γ and fβ , a (D + h−1{ζ}, β)-th function, we
have 〈Cg(δ) ∩ δ : δ ∈ h
−1{ζ}〉 obeys fβ.
2) We say f ∈ ω1(ω1) is a (Dω1 + S, γ)-th function when: S (D+ω1 ,⊇)
“in V [G
˜
],
{x ∈ V ω1/G
˜
: V ω1/G |= x an ordinal < f/G
˜
} has order type γ”.
3.8 Claim. Assume
(a) p is a simple reasonable parameter, ℓg(p) of uncountable cofinality
(b) S ∈ D+ω1 and N ∈
⋃
α
E pα ⇒ N ∩ ω1 ∈ S
(c) p is a non-aα,α-loser (or just non a
′
α,α-loser) for all α ∈ C
∗, C∗ a club of
ℓg(p),
(d) C¯ obeys f on S which is a (Dω1 + S, γ)-function
(e) 0 < Min(C), g(α) = Min(C∗\α).
Then QC¯ is (p, g)-proper.
Proof. Similar.
∗ ∗ ∗
Another example (which could have been done in [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII]) is:
3.9 Definition. 1) We say D¯ = 〈Dδ : δ < ω1 limit〉 is an ω1-filter-sequence if:
(a) Dδ is a filter on δ, containing the co-bounded subsets
(b) Dδ is a P -filter and some Cδ ∈ Dδ has order type ω (P -filter means that Dδ
contains all co-finite sets and if An ∈ Dδ for n < ω then for some A ∈ Dδ
we have n < ω ⇒ |A\An| < ℵ0) (can generalize as in 3.1(2) but did not)
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(c) for every club C ⊆ ω1 and α < ω1, the set A
α
C [D¯ ] is stationary, where, by
induction on α we define:
AαC [D¯ ] = {δ < ω1 : δ is a limit ordinal, δ ∈ C and for every β < α we have
δ = sup(δ ∩AβC [D¯ ]), moreover δ ∩ A
β
C [D¯ ] ∈ Dδ}.
2) We say a reasonable parameter p obeys D¯ if for each α < ℓg(p) and N ∈ Eα we
have: D¯ ∈ N and we have
Dpα(N) =
{
Y :Y ⊆ N ∩
⋃
β<α
Eβ is closed (see 2.11) and if
α > 0 then there are
β¯ = 〈βn : n < ω〉, M¯ = 〈Mn : n < ω〉 satisfying
(a) βn ∈ N ∩ α and
(b) either
∧
n
[α = βn + 1]
or βn < βn+1, sup
n<ω
βn = sup(α ∩N)
(c) Mn ∈ Y ∩ Eβn ,Mn ∈Mn+1,⋃
n<ω
Mn = N ∩
⋃
β∈α∩N
H (χβ)
(d) {Mn ∩ ω1 : n < ω} ∈ DN∩ω1
}
.
3) We say a forcing notion Q is a D¯ − NNR0κ-forcing if for every reasonable pa-
rameter p which obeys D¯ we have: Q is an NNR0κ-forcing over p (see 2.16).
4) For a P -filter D , we say a reasonable parameter p obeys D if:
for every N ∈ Eα
Dpα(N) =
{
Y :Y ⊆ N ∩
⋃
β<α
Eβ is closed (see 2.11) and if α > 0 then
for some β¯, M¯ satisfying clauses (a), (b), (c)
of part (2) and
(d)′ {n : Mn ∈ Y } ∈ D
(∗)D is a P -filter on ω
}
.
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5) In the parts 1) - 4) above we may replace the word filter by ultrafilter if the D ’s
are ultrafilter (so we have “ω1-ultrafilter sequence”).
3.10 Claim. 1) If ♦ℵ1 (or much less), then there is an ω1-ultrafilter sequence.
2) If D¯ is an ω1-filter sequence and 〈(χα, Eα) : α < α∗〉 is a in Definition 1.1, then
there is a reasonable parameter p of length ω1 obeying D¯ which is a non-a-loser
χpα = χα, E
p
α = Eα.
3) If ♦ℵ1 and 〈(χα, Eα) : α < α
∗〉 is as in Definition 1.1 and D is a P -filter on ω,
then some reasonable parameter p is P -filter like, non-aid-loser with χ
p
α = χα, E
p
α =
Eα, α∗,p = α∗. Similarly for ultrafilters.
4) Instead of ♦ℵ1 it is enough to assume CH and that for some 〈Cδ : δ < ω1 limit〉
and normal filter D on ω1 and for every club C of ω1, {δ : δ > sup(Cδ\C)} ∈ D.
Proof. Straight (in part (4), we define the Cδ’s simultaneously).
3.11 Claim. 1) If p is a reasonable parameter obeying D, a P -filter on ω [or
P -ultrafilter on ω], then for some D¯ , D¯ is an ω1-filter-sequence [or ω1-ultrafilter-
sequence] and p obeys D¯.
2) If p is a P -point filter (or ultrafilter), then p is a non-a-loser.
Proof. Should be clear.
3.12 Remark. We may consider higher order types than ω.
3.13 Claim. 1) Assume
(a) C¯ = 〈Cδ,ℓ : ℓ < kδ, δ < ω1 limit〉, 1 + κ ≤ kδ ≤ ω, Cδ,ℓ is a closed unbounded
subset of δ and ℓ < m < kδ ⇒ Cδ,ℓ ∩ Cδ,m = ∅
(b) Q = QC¯ = {C : C is a closed bounded subset of ω1 such that for every limit
δ < sup(C) and for every ℓ < kδ except < 1 + κ many, δ > sup(C ∩ Cδ,ℓ)}
(c) p obeys the P -ultrafilter D and is a reasonable parameter.
Then Q is a p−NNR0κ forcing notion.
2) In part (1) if we add: N ∈ Eα & Dpα(N) = {Y : {n : Mn ∈ Y } ∈ DN},DN a
P -point ultrafilter (see above) and ℓ < kδ ⇒ {n < ω :Mn∩ω1 ∈ Cδ,ℓ} = ∅ mod DN ,
then we can allow Cδ,0 = Cδ,1.
3) Assume
NNR REVISITED SH656 37
(a) Dδ is a family of subsets of Dom(Dδ), the intersection Y of any < 1+ κ of
them satisfies
(∗) ∃n(∃y1, . . . , yn ∈ Y )[δ > sup(
n⋂
ℓ=1
Cδ,yℓ)]
(b) C¯ = 〈Cδ,x : x ∈ Dom(Dδ) and δ is a limit ordinal < ω1〉
(c) 〈Cδ,x : x ∈ Dom(Dδ)〉 is a sequence of pairwise disjoint subsets of δ
(d) X¯ ∈
∏
δ<ω1
Dom(Dδ)
(e) QC¯,X¯,D¯ = {C : C is a closed bounded subset of ω1 such that for every limit
δ ≤ sup(C) we have (∃x ∈ Xδ)(δ > sup(C ∩ Cδ,x))}
ordered by: end extension
(f) D¯ is a P -ultrafilter sequence.
Then Q is a p−NNR0κ forcing notion p which obeys D¯ .
Proof. Straight.
1) So let V = V Pα0 ,Pα “Qα = QC¯
˜
is as above” and in V0, N0 ∈ E0, N0 ∈ N1 ∈
Eα = {Mn : n < ω}, DN0 as in Definition 3.13(2), p ∈ Pα+1 ∩ N,Gm ⊆ N1 ∩ Pα
is generic over N1 for m < k < 1 + κ (so k is now fixed). So for each ℓ we have
C
˜
N0∩ω1,ℓ[Gm] is a closed subset of δ and for ℓ1 < ℓ2 < kδN0 we have C˜ N0∩ω1,ℓ1
[Gm]∩
C
˜
N0∩ω1,ℓ2 [Gm] = ∅ so for some ℓ(m) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , kδN0 − 1} we have ℓ 6= ℓ(m) ⇒
C
˜
N0∩ω1,ℓ[Gm] = ∅ mod DN0 . Now let B = {n :if ℓ < kδ, ℓ /∈ {ℓ(m) : m < k} and
ℓ < n then Mn ∩ ω1 /∈ C
˜
N0∩ω1,ℓ[Gm] for m < k and p ∈ Mn} belongs to DN0 .
Clearly, without loss of generality 〈Mn : n < ω〉 ∈ N1, DN0 ∈ N1, B ∈ N1. Let
B = {ni : i < ω}, ni increasing with i and 〈In : n < ω〉 list the dense open subsets
of Pα+1 which belongs to N0. We can choose pi by induction on i < ω such that:
pi ∈ Nni ∩ Pα+1
pi ↾ α ∈
⋂
m<k
Gm
pi ∈
⋂
{In : n < ni,In ∈ Nni and i > 0}
p ≤ p
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pi ≤ pi+1
pi+1\pi is disjoint to ∪ {C
˜
N0∩ω1,ℓ[Gm] : ℓ < k0, ℓ < ni and m < k ⇒ ℓ 6= ℓ(m)}.
This is possible as
⊗ ( ⋃
m<k
ℓ<k & ℓ6=ℓ(m)
C
˜
N0∩ω1,ℓ[Gm]
)
∩ ω1 ∩Mn is a bounded subset of Mn ∩ ω1.
2), 3), 4) Similarly. 3.13
3.14 Remark. 1) The forcing notion from 3.13(1) is NNR0ℵ0 -forcing notion for every
p, non-aid-loser.
2) If p is a reasonable parameter obeying D¯ , an ω1-filter sequence, then any (< ω1)-
proper forcing is p-proper.
Proof. Similar to earlier proofs.
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§4 Second preservation of not adding reals
We shall concentrate on the simple case.
4.1 Definition. Let p be a reasonable parameter. We say that Q¯ is a p−NNR1κ
iteration (where 2 ≤ κ ≤ ℵ0 as we omit κ = ℵ1 for convenience) if:
(a) cf(ℓg(p)) > ℓg(Q¯) (for simplicity)
(b) Q¯ is a countable support iteration of proper forcing notions
[in [Sh 311] we will relax the requirement that each iterand is proper]
such that i < ℓg(Q¯)⇒ Pi adds no reals
(follows by other parts (close (d)) even for Pi+1, i < ℓg(Q¯)
(c) [long properness] for each i, for some fi ∈ F
p
club we have Pi “Q
˜
i is (p, fi)-
proper, fi increasing continuous, see Definition 2.8(2) + 2.8(4)
(d) [κ-anti w.d.] if fi(α) ≤ β < ℓg(p), {Q¯, i, α, β} ∈ N0 ∈ Eα, N0 ∈ N1 ∈
Eβ, k < 1+κ, j = i+1 and for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k−1 we have qℓ ∈ Pi is (N1, Pi)-
generic and is (N0, Pi)-generic, qℓ  “G
˜
Pi ∩N1 = G
ℓ”, Gℓ ∩N0 = G
∗, p∗ ∈
Pj ∩N0 satisfies p
∗ ↾ i ∈ G∗∗ and lastly Y =:
⋂
ℓ<k
M [Gℓ, N1, y
∗] ∈ Dβ(N1),
then for some G∗∗ ∈ N1, G
∗∗ ⊆ N0 ∩ Pj is generic over N0, G
∗ ⊆ G∗∗ and
p∗ ∈ G∗∗ and
∧
ℓ<k
∨
r∈Gℓ
r Pi “G
∗∗ ↾ Q
˜
i(= {p(i) : p ∈ G
∗∗}) has an upper
bound in Q
˜
i”.
4.2 Remark. 1) κ is the amount of “D-completeness”, in other words what versions
of weak diamond we kill by our iteration.
2) Question: Why do we ask for fi ∈ V and not a Pi-name f
˜
i of such a function?
Answer: If i < ℓg(Q¯)⇒ Pi |= cf(ℓg(p))-c.c., then we can find f
′
i ∈ F
p, fi ≥ f
˜
i; so
as we are assuming, for conveniency cf(ℓg(p)) > |Pα| there is no point at present
for fi to be a Pi-name.
2A) In clause (d) we have implicitly used:
(∗) if α ≤ β′ < β then clause (d) for (α, β) and k implies clause (d) for (α, β′)
and k.
This holds by clause (i) of Definition 1.1.
We could replace fi by a club Ei of ℓg(p), letting fi(α) = Ei\α.
40 SAHARON SHELAH
3) No real reason to “use some κ”, but also no real reason to use 2. For each ℓ
to find G∗∗ means essentially “forcing with Qi adds no reals”. The point is the
common solution.
4) In clause (c) for a club C of ℓg(p) we catch our tail, that is fi(α)∩C = C\α for
a club of α < ℓg(p). We could use less, no real point now.
5) In clause (d) much of the freedom/variation will be due to the decision how
“similar” are 〈Gℓ : ℓ < k〉 such that G∗∗ exists. Here we demand
(α) Y ∈ Dβ(N1).
In [Sh:f, Ch.VIII,§2] it is essentially required that
(β) G0 ×G1 × · · · ×Gk−1 ⊆ (Pi × · · · × Pi) ∩N1 (k times) is
generic over N1.
In [Sh:f, Ch.V]
(γ) the common Y is a predetermined increasing sequence of models.
We have a trade-off; clause (β) makes demand (d) in 4.1 easier, but the parallel of
(c) harder compared to clause (α).
This explains why the present work doesn’t supercede Ch.XVIII,§2.
6) It is harder to win with a “slower” function, so the assumption above is the
strongest possible - although practically makes no difference, probably.
4.3 Claim. Let Q¯ be a p−NNR1κ iteration (see Definition 4.1), κ ∈ {2,ℵ0} and
p is a reasonable parameter and p is a af -winner for some f ∈ F
p
club or at least
a′f -non loser.
1) Forcing with Pℓg(Q¯) = Lim(Q¯) does not add reals (so consequently no ω-sequences,
as we are assuming properness).
2) If i ≤ j ≤ ℓg(Q¯), then
(b)′ Pj/Pi is proper
(c)′ Pj/Pi is (p, fi,j)-proper, where
fi,j ∈ F
p
club is increasing continuous and is computable from the fε ∈ F
p
for ε ∈ [i, j),
(d)′ we have the parallel of clause (d), this time without assuming that j = i+1.
Proof. By induction on ℓg(Q¯). For notational simplicity we assume
⊠ all fi are even in F
p
end so consider them as functions from ℓg(p) to ℓg(p)
(increasing continuous), and we demand also the fi,j are like that, increasing
continuous and moreover fi,j(fi,j(α)) = fi,j(α) and they are ≥ f
∗, f∗ ∈
F pend increasing continuous, p is af∗-winner or at least a
′
f∗-non-loser.
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Case 1: ℓg(Q¯) = 0
Trivial.
Case 2: ℓg(Q¯) = i(∗) + 1
Part (1): Pi(∗) adds no reals by the induction hypothesis, Q
˜
i(∗) adds no reals by
clause (d) in Definition 4.1, hence Pi(∗)+1 = Pi(∗) ∗Q
˜
i(∗) adds no reals.
Part (2): Clause (b)′ is known, (namely Pj/Pi is proper).
Clause (c)′:
Given i ≤ j ≤ ℓg(Q¯) if j < i(∗) + 1 the conclusion follows by the induction
hypothesis. So assume j = i(∗) + 1. If i = j, the required demand is trivial, so
assume i < j. If i = i(∗), use clause (c) of Definition 4.1 for i. So assume i < i(∗).
Let fi,j,0 = fi(∗), fi,j,m+1 = fi(∗) ◦ fi,j(∗) ◦ fi,j,m and fi,j(α) = sup
m<ω
fi,j,m(α). Check
that they are as required in ⊠. For proving “Pj/Pi is (p, fi,j)-proper” assume
(a) N ≺ (H (χ),∈) is countable
(b) {Q¯, i, j, α, β, fi,i(∗), fi(∗), fi,j} ∈ N
(c) α ≤ fi,j(α) ≤ β < ℓg(p)
(d) q ∈ Pi is (N,Pi)-generic
(e) p ∈ N ∩ Pj , p ↾ i ≤ q
(f) Y ∈ Dβ(N)
(g) q  “Y ⊆ M [G
˜
Pi , N ]”.
First we deal with version 2 and assume that p is simple. Choose y∗ ∈ N which
codes enough; clearly β′ =: fi(∗)(α) belongs to N . So fi,i(∗)(β
′) ≤ β, hence by the
induction hypothesis there are q′, Y ′ such that: p ↾ i(∗) ≤ q, q ≤ q′ ∈ Pi(∗), q
′ is
(N,Pi(∗))-generic, Y
′ ⊆ Y, Y ′ ∈ Dβ′(N) and q
′  “Y ′ ⊆ M [G
˜
Pi(∗), N, y
∗]”.
Next, we apply clause (c) in the Definition 4.1 for i(∗), so there are q′′, Y ′′ such
that p ≤ q′′, q′ ≤ q′′ ∈ Pi(∗)+1 = Pj , q
′′ is (N,Pj)-generic, Y
′′ ⊆ Y ′, Y ′′ ∈ Dα(N)
and q′′  “Y ⊆ M [G
˜
Pj , N, y
∗]”.
The proof for version 1 is similar.
Clause (d)′:
Recall that we have demanded fi,j(fi,j(α)) = fi,j(α) (see ⊠ at the beginning of
the proof).
Let N0, N1, G
∗, α, β, i, j, p, k, qℓ (for ℓ < k), G
ℓ (for ℓ < k) and G∗ be as in the
assumption of clause (d) (from Definition 4.1) be given.
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Without loss of generality i < j, i < i(∗), j = i(∗) + 1 (as in the proof of clause (c)
the other cases are trivial).
First, choose G∗∗ for G∗, α, β, i, i(∗), G∗∗ ∈ N1. For each ℓ < k, if for some sℓ ∈ G
ℓ
we have
sℓ Pi “in Pi(∗)/G
˜
Pi there is an upper bound to G
∗∗”
then (possibly increasing sℓ, recalling Gℓ is generic over N
∗) there are sℓ ∈ G
ℓ, rℓ ∈
Pi(∗) ∩ N1 such that sℓ forces that rℓ is an upper bound to G
∗∗ and without loss
of generality rℓ ↾ i ≤ sℓ. Now without loss of generality [Gℓ1 = Gℓ2 ⇒ sℓ1 = sℓ2 ]
and [Gℓ1 6= Gℓ2 ⇒ sℓ1 , sℓ2 incompatible]. Now choose r ∈ Pi(∗) ∩N1 with domain
⊆ i(∗)\i as follows: Dom(r) =
⋃
ℓ<k
Dom(rℓ)\i and r(α) is rℓ(α) if sℓ ∈ G
˜
Pi , ℓ < k
and is ∅Pα if this occurs for no ℓ. Renaming r ∈ Ni ∩ Pi(∗), Dom(r) ⊆ i(∗)\i and
sℓ ∈ G
ℓ, rℓ = sℓ ∪ r is above G
∗∗ in Pi(∗). Let βℓ = fi,j,1+ℓ(α) for ℓ ≤ k. We choose
by induction on ℓ ≤ k the objects Yℓ, q
′
ℓ,Mℓ such that
Y0 = Y
M0 = N1
N0 ∈Mℓ+1
Mℓ+1 ∈Mℓ ∩ Eβk−ℓ
Yℓ+1 ⊆ Yℓ
Yℓ ∈ Dβℓ(Mℓ)
Mℓ+1 ∈ Yℓ
qℓ ≤ q
′
ℓ ∈ Pi(∗)
q′ℓ is (Mℓ+1, Pi(∗))-generic
q′ℓ forces a value to G
˜
Pi(∗) ∩Mℓ+1
NNR REVISITED SH656 43
q′ℓ is (N0, Pi(∗))-generic
q′ℓ  “Yℓ+1 ⊆ M [G
˜
Pi(∗) ,Mℓ]”
q′ℓ ↾ i ∈ G
ℓ.
(In the older version we have to increase β ω times if k not given, arriving to a fixed
point.)
No problem, now apply clause (d) of the definition for i(∗), N0,Mk,
〈q′ℓ : ℓ < k〉, Yk, G
∗∗ and get G∗∗∗ as required.
Comment: The Y transfers information between the various generics. In
[Sh:f, Ch.V], in the first proof after ω steps we are lost, but having the common
tower of models help us.
Case 3: δ = ℓg(Q¯) is limit.
Part (1): Follows from clause (d) in part (2) and part (2) is proved below.
Part (2): Let fi,j be fast enough (you can collect the demands used below).
Clause (b)′ is obvious. We first prove clause (d)′ and later (c)′.
Clause (d)′: So again without loss of generality i < j = δ.
Let N0, N1, p, G
∗, α, β, k < 1 + κ and Gℓ, qℓ for ℓ < k be as in the assumption of
clause (d) in Definition 4.1 but for i < j.
We for simplicity use κ = ℵ0. We choose γ ∈ N0, α < γ < β such that γ is larger
enough, in particular: i ≤ i′ < j′ < j ⇒ fi′,j′(γ) = γ.
Choose 〈im : m < ω〉 ∈ N1 such that:
i0 = i
im < im+1
sup
m<ω
im = sup(j ∩N0).
Choose y∗ ∈ N ∩ H (χγ) coding enough. We choose M0,M1,M2,M3,M4 ∈ N1 ∩
Eγ ∩ Y such that
N0 ∈M0 ∈M1 ∈M2 ∈M3 ∈M4
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Y ∩Mm ∈ Dγ(Mm) for m < 5.
Choose q′ℓ ∈ G
ℓ ∩M4 above G
ℓ ∩M3 so
q′ℓ is (M0, Pi)-generic,(M1, Pi)-generic,(M2, Pi)-generic, (M3, Pi)-generic.
Let 〈Im : m < ω〉 ∈M0 list the dense open subsets of Pj from N0.
Explanation. Now we shall use the diagonal argument, choose G
˜
P ∩ N0, pm ∈
Pim ∩N0, rm ∈ Pin as usual, using in the m-th step fim,im+1+ relevant (d)
′ things.
We fulfill the above in M4, so in the end can find a solution in N1, by using a
canonical construction, e.g. each time the <∗χ-choice.
But to carry this we need to have finitely many candidates for G
˜
Pim
∩M0 with
a common Ym.
(Note: if Q× . . .×Q is proper, like in Ch.XVIII,§2 we can get such a common Ym,
i.e. the present result is stronger for this stage.)
To get this in the inductive step, we need in step m − 1 that for M1 we just have
finitely many candidates for G
˜
Pim
∩M1, and in turn to get this in the step m− 1
we use that in step m−2 for M2 we have: from every maximal antichain we choose
a finite subset. To get this we use that for M3 we just ask M3[G
˜
Pim−3
] ∩ V = M3.
So along the way N0,M0,M1,M2,M3 our induction demands go down, but slowly,
so that in each step m, advancing for say M0, we have to preserve less than really
knowing G
˜
Pim
∩ M0, and are helped by our demand on M1, just like in [Sh:f,
Ch.XVIII]. So compared to [Sh:f, Ch.V], we have a finite tower.
Returning to the proof we choose by induction onm < ω the objects rm, G
∗
m, pm, nm,
〈Gℓm : ℓ < nm〉, Ym such that
(a) rm ∈ Pim ∩M4
(b) Dom(rm) ⊆ [i, im)
(c) rm+1 ↾ im = rm
(comment: rm’s act as a generic for N0)
(d) q′ℓ ∪ rm ∈ Pim is (M0, Pim)-generic, (M1, Pim)-generic, (M2, Pim)-generic,
(M3, Pim)-generic
(e) if ℓ < k,J ⊆ Pim is dense open and J ∈M2, then for some finite
J ⊆ I ∩M2,J is predense above q′ℓ ∪ rm
(like in the proof of ωω-bounding)
(f) nm < ω, and
ℓ < nm ⇒ G
ℓ
m is a subset of Pim ∩M0 generic over M0,
and Gℓm ∈M1
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(g) Gℓm+1 ∩ Pim ∈ {G
ℓ
m : ℓ < nm}
(h) n0 = k,G
ℓ
0 = G
ℓ ∩M1
(i) qℓ ∪ rm  “G
˜
Pi,m ∩M1 ∈ {G
ℓ
m : ℓ < nm}”
(j) G∗m is a subset of Pim ∩N0 generic over N0
(k) G∗m ⊆ G
ℓ
m, so G
∗
m ⊆ G
∗
m+1, G
∗
0 = G
∗
(l) pm ∈ Pj ∩N
(m) p0 = p
(n) pm ↾ im ∈ G
∗
m
(o) pm ≤ pm+1 ∈ Im
(p) Ym ⊆ M [Gℓm,M0, y
∗]
(q) Ym ∈ Dγ(M0).
Why is this sufficient? If we can carry out the induction, then without loss of
generality the construction belongs to N1.
So G∗∗ = {s ∈ Pj ∩N0 :
∨
n<ω
s ≤ pm} is as required, as q
′
ℓ =: qℓ ∪
⋃
m
rm ∈ Pj ∩N1,
and is above G∗∗ and p ≤ q′ℓ.
Induction:
m = 0: Trivial.
m+ 1: Stage A: Choosing pm+1 is trivial, the demands are: pm+1 ≥ pm, pm+1 ↾
im ∈ G
∗
m and pm+1 ∈ Im.
Stage B: Choosing G∗m+1: apply the induction hypothesis using clause (d)
′ of what
we are proving with im, im+1, γ, fim,im+1(γ), N0,M1 here standing for i, j, α, β,N0, N1
there.
Stage C: Let {Hℓm : ℓ < nm+1} list the possibilities of G
˜
Pim
∩M1 (by clause (e)
this exists).
Without loss of generality Hℓm ∩M0 = G
h(ℓ)
m , for some function h = hm : nm+1 →
nm.
We choose sℓm ∈ Pim+1 ∩M1, above G
∗
m+1, such that s
ℓ
m ↾ im ∈ G
h(ℓ)
m . Now repeat
the argument of the successor stage of shrinking Y (but now we have a fixed γ!).
So we can find tℓm ∈ Pim+1 ∩M1, above s
ℓ
m, t
ℓ
m ↾ im ∈ H
ℓ
m, t
ℓ
n  “G
˜
Pim+1
∩M0 =:
Gℓm+1” such that
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Ym+1 =:
⋂
i<nm+1
M [Gℓm+1,M0, y
∗] ∈ Dγ(M0).
The rest is as in §1 so we have finished proving clause (d)′ in the case ℓg(Q¯) is a
limit ordinal (which is last).
Clause (c)′: Again, without loss of generality i < j = δ. So assume fi,j(α) ≤
β, {i, j, α, β} ∈ N∗ ∈ Eβ, q is (N
∗, Pi)-generic, Y
∗ ∈ Dβ(N
∗), q ∈ Pα and q 
“Y ∗ ⊆ M [G
˜
Pi , N
∗, y∗]” are given. We prove the desired conclusion by induction
on α. For each α, we would like to simulate a play of aα,β(N
∗), supplying the
challenger with a strategy. For this we apply the proof of clause (d)′.
Choose N0, N1,M0, . . . ,M4, q0, G0, G
∗ (and k = 1) as there for some α′ < γ′ < β′
as there such that β < α′ such that N∗, q, Y ∗ ∈ N0 (easy to find).
Explanation: Note: as p is simple, we can use N ≺ (H (χ),∈), N ∩ H (χβ) ∈ Eβ
with no mention - there were other places we could have said so. During the
construction this time we demand pm ∈ N
∗∩Pj , so a generic forN0 is not necessarily
created. But still pm ≤ pm+1, pm ↾ im ∈ G
∗
m. Now pm will be played by the
chooser. Now g(1+α) will be a fixed point of fim,im+1. So we can add the demand
N∗[G∗m ∩N
∗] ∩ V = N∗, i.e. G∗m is generic over N
∗ and
M [G∗m ∩N
∗, N∗, y∗] ∈ Dδ(1+α)(N
∗).
The challenger chooses
Xm+1 = M [G
∗
m ∩N
∗, N∗, y∗] ∩
⋃
ξ<γ(1+α)
Eξ ∩ {M : pn ∈M} ∈ N0.
Now the chooser chooses αm, β
′
m and the challenger chooses βn ≥ β
′
m, fim,im+1(α)
in N∗0 ∩ j and the chooser chooses M
∗
m such that pm ∈Mm+1.
Comment: The game was defined with this point in mind.
Now the chooser chooses Yn ∈ Dβn(M0), Yn ⊆ Xn ∩M0, Yn ∈ N
∗
0 (check definition
of game!)
Now we play Zn for the challenger as follows:
there is pm+1 ≥ pm, (M
∗
m+1, Pim+1)-generic
pm+1 ↾ im ∈ G
∗
m
and p′m+1 forces G
˜
Pim+1
∩N∗ and
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forces Zn = Yn ∩M [G
˜
Pim+1
,M∗m, y
∗] ∈ Dαn(M
∗
m).
As the challenger does not have a winning strategy, there is a play he wins, giving⋃
n<ω
G∗n ∩N
∗
0 with a bound.
Continuation of the Proof: Choose also 〈i′m : m < ω〉 ∈ N0 such that im ∈ N
∗, i0 =
i, im < im+1, sup{im : m < ω} = sup(N
∗ ∩ j) and this time we let 〈I ′m : m < ω〉
list the dense open subsets of Pj from N
∗. For m < ω let Tm be the set of
the finite sequences x from M4 coding 〈rx,m : m ≤ m〉, 〈Gx,m : m ≤ m〉, 〈px,m :
m ≤ m〉, 〈nx,m : m ≤ m〉, 〈G
ℓ
x,m : ℓ ≤ nx,m, m ≤ m〉, 〈Yx,m : m ≤ m〉 and also
(Xx,m, αx,m, β
′
x,m, βx,m,Mx,n, y
′
x,m,M
′
x,m, yx,m) for m ≤ m and Zx,m for m < m
satisfying:
clauses (a)-(k),(m),(n),(p),(q) from the proof of (d)′ above and
(l)′ pm ∈j ∩N
∗
(o)′ pm ≤ pm+1 ∈ I ′n
(r)′ rx,m is (N
∗, Gim)-generic for m ≤m
(s)′ 〈(Xx,m, αx,m, β
′
x,m, βx,m,Mx,m, Yx,m,M
′
x,m, Zx,m′) : m ≤ m〉 belongs to N
and is an initial segment of a play of the game a′α,β(N
∗, p) or just a′α,β(N
∗, N, p),
note that in them-th move the challenger has not yet chose Zx,m, (see clause
(e) of Definition 2.2(1)
(t)′ Zx,m ⊆ Ym+1
(u)′ yx,m code pm, 〈im : m < ω〉
(v)′ fim,im+1(αm) ≤ β
′
m for m ≤m.
Let x ⊳ y has the natural meaning for x ∈ Tm1 , y ∈ Tm2 ,m1 <m2.
Note
⊠1 Tm ⊆ N for m < ω
⊠2 T0 6= ∅
⊠3 if x ∈ Tm, then considering the game aα,β(N∗, p), x is an initial segment of
a play of it (see clause (s)′ above).
Assume
(∗) M ′
m
∈ Yx,m∩Eαm ∩ (Mx,m∪{Mx,m∩H (χ
p
m
)} satisfying ym, y
′
m
∈M ′
m
and
Zm ⊆ Dαx,m(M
′
m), Zm ⊆ Ym (hence Zm ⊆ Xx,m) and Xm+1 ∈ Dβ(N
∗) ∩
Xx,m such that Zm ⊆ Xm+1 and αm+1 ∈ α ∩ N
∗ and any β′
m+1 ∈ β ∩
N∗\pim+1,imr (αm+1), y
′
m+1 ∈ N ∩H (χ
p
αm+1
) and any βm ∈ β ∩N\β
′
n\αn
and Mm+1 ∈ Xm+1 ∩ Eβm+1 , ym+1 ∈ Mm+1 ∩ H (χ
p
αm
) satisfying y′
m+1 ∈
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Mm+1 and Ym+1 ∈ N ∩ DXm+1(Mm+1) and any M
′
m+1 ∈ Ym+1 ∩ Eαn ∩
(Mm+1 ∪ {Mm+1 ∩H (χpαm)} satisfying ym+1, y
′
m+1 ∈M
′
m+1.
Then
(∗∗) there is y ∈ Tm+1 such that x⊳y and (Zy,m, Xy,m+1, αy,m+1, β
′
y,m+1, y
′
y,m+1,
βy,m+1, yy,m+1,My,m+1, Yy,m+1,M
′
y,m+1) is equal to
(Zm, Xm+1, αm+1, β
′
m+1, y
′
m+1, βm+1, ym+1, Mm+1, Ym+1,M
′
m+1).
Why? Because fim,im+1(αm) ≤ βm, hence we know that Pim+1/Pim is
(p, αn, βn)-proper and let Gim ⊆ Pim be generic over V, rm ∈ Gim to the
model M ′x,m and the set Yx,m. So now we can describe a strategy for the
challenger in the game aα,β(N
∗, p) (or a′α,β(N
∗, N, p)) delaying his choice
ofM ′m, Zm to the (m+1)-th move, he just chose on the side xm ∈ Tm which
“code” they play so far, and preserve xm ⊳ xm+1.
By ⊠3 this is O.K. - all possible choices of the chooser are allowed, that is this
gives a well defined strategy for the challenger (will he have some free choice, this
does not hurt). But the chosen does not lose the game, so there is such a choice
〈xm : m < ω〉 with ∪{(M
′
xm+1,m
} ∪ Yxm+1,m : m < ω} ∈ Dα(N) and
⋃
m<ω
rm is as
required.
∗ ∗ ∗
The adaptation for the proof when κ = 2 should be clear.
Proof. Similar to the proof of 1.9, with some changes. We choose 〈jn : n < ω〉 ∈M0
such that j < jn < jn+1 < h
∗(j, i), h∗(jn, im) < jn+1
(l) nm is a power of 2, say 2
n∗m and so we can rename {Gℓm : ℓ < nm} as
{Gηm : η ∈ 2
n∗m}
(m)
(α) Mη ∈M1 for η ∈
(n∗m≥)2
(β) M<> = N0
(γ) Mη ∈Mηˆ〈0〉 ∩Mηˆ〈1〉
(δ) η ⊳ ν1 ∈
n∗m2, η ⊳ ν2 ∈
n∗m2⇒ Gν1m ∩Mη = G
ν2
m ∩Mη so we call it K
η
m
(ε) Mηˆ〈0〉 =Mηˆ〈1〉 when η ∈
n∗m2 call it Nη
(ζ) Nη ∈ Eℓg(η) for η ∈
(m∗m>)2
(η) Yη = M [Kηˆ〈0〉, Nη] ∩M [Kηˆ〈1〉, Nη] ∈ Djℓg(η)(Nη).
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Discussion: We may be interested in non-proper forcing, say semi-proper and UP
ones (see [Sh:f, Ch.X,XI,XV] and [Sh 311]). Here the change from (reasonable)
parameter p = pV to pV [G] is more serious as {N ∩ χα : N ∈ E p
V [G]
} is in general
not equal to {N ∩ χα : N ∈ E pα}. We intend to spell it out in [Sh 311].
We may be interested in combining this work with [Sh 587], [Sh:F259]. Intend
to deal with it later (see also [Sh 655]).
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§5 Problematic forcing
5.1 Discussion: 1) In the examples the “barely adding reals but not so” may occur
on some stationary E ⊆ [χ∗]ℵ0 and otherwise just properness is asked. We do not
bother to do this in the examples.
2) We may like to put the present lemmas and [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§2] and more to-
gether. The way is clear, we concentrate on κ ∈ ℵ0.
So instead of a “tower” with six levels we have one with n(∗) + 1 levels.
5.2 Definition. 1) We say Q¯ is an p−NNR0
ℵ0,P¯ r,Ξ¯
-iteration for p is:
(a) Q¯ is a CS iteration of proper notions forcing, p-proper
(b) forcing with Lim(Q¯) = Pℓg(Q¯) does not add reals
(c) P¯ r = 〈Prℓ : ℓ < n(∗)〉, Ξ¯ = 〈Ξℓ : ℓ ≤ n(∗)〉,Ξℓ ⊆ ℓg(p)× ℓg(p)
(d) Prℓ(N, G¯, P ) implies: P a forcing notion, N is a countable elementary
submodel of (H (χ),∈), G¯ = 〈Gm : m < k〉, k < ω,Gm ⊆ N ∩ P is generic
over N
(e) if ℓ = 0, P rℓ(N, G¯, P ), then
∧
ℓ
Gℓ = G0
(f) if ℓ = n(∗)− 1, then Prℓ(N, G¯, P ), iff the demand in clause (d) holds
(g) if Prℓ(N, G¯, P ) and G¯ ⊳ G¯
′, ℓg(G¯′) finite and Rang(G¯) = Rang(G¯′) then
Prℓ(N, G¯
′, P )
(h) Pr0(N, G¯, P ) holds iff (the condition in clause (c) and)
∧
ℓ
Gℓ = G0
(i) if ℓ < n(∗), i < j ≤ ℓg(Q¯), N0 ≺ N1 ≺ (H (χ),∈), p ∈ N0, N0, N1 are count-
able and for some (α, β) ∈ Ξℓ∩N0 we have N0∩H (χpα) ∈ Eα, N1∩H (χ
p
β) ∈
Eβ, P rℓ(N0, G¯, Pi), P rℓ+1(N1, H¯, Pi), ℓg(G¯) = ℓg(H¯), Gk ⊆ Hk, p¯ = 〈pk :
k < ℓg(G¯)〉, pℓ ∈ N0 ∩ Pj , pk ↾ i ∈ Gk, ℓ = 0 ⇒ pk = p0, then we can find
G¯+ = 〈G+k : k < ℓg(G¯)〉 ∈ N1 such that Pr(N0, G¯
+, Pj) and pk ∈ G
+
k
(j) assume Prℓ(N, G¯, Pi), in < in+1, in ∈ N, i0 = i, supn<ω in = sup(N ∩
j), (α, β) ∈ N ∩ Ξℓ, N
′ = N ∩ H (χpα) ∈ Eα, then in the following game
the Pr+ℓ -player has a winning strategy (or just does not lose).
Before the n-th move G¯n such that Prℓ(N, G¯
n, Pin) is chosen ℓg(G¯
n) = ℓg(Q¯) with
G¯0 = G¯. In the n-th move the challenger chooses p¯n = 〈pnk : k < ℓg(G¯)〉, p
n
k ∈
N0 ∩ Pin+1, P
n
k ↾ in ∈ G
n
k , ℓ = 0 ⇒ p
n
k = p
n
0 and then the chooser chooses G¯
n+1 is
above such that pnk ∈ G
n+1
k . In the end of the play the chooser wins if Prℓ(N, G¯
∗, Pj)
where G∗k = {p ∈ N ∩ Pj : for every n, p ↾ in ∈ G
n
k}.
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5.3 Comment: 0) Of course, we can also use a reasonable parameter for induction.
1) In [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII,§2] for NNR2κ we can use weaken clause (5): t a tree with 2
branches if Q¯ ∈ N ≺ (H (χ),∈), if i∗ < α, Pi∗,i =: {(q, p0, p1) ∈ Pi : p0 ↾ i∗ = p1 ↾
i∗}, then for i < j ≤ δ, i non-limit we have: Pi∗,i/Pi∗,j is E2-proper.
In light of the previous proofs this is straight.
2) We can replace Dα(N) by Dα,i,j(N) for i < j ≤ δ
∗, δ∗ the supremum of the
length of the iterations we consider.
52 SAHARON SHELAH
REFERENCES.
[DvSh 65] Keith J. Devlin and Saharon Shelah. A weak version of ♦ which follows
from 2ℵ0 < 2ℵ1 . Israel Journal of Mathematics, 29:239–247, 1978.
[Sh 311] Saharon Shelah. A more general iterable condition ensuring ℵ1 is not
collapsed, II. preprint.
[Sh 655] Saharon Shelah. Iteration of λ-complete forcing notions not collapsing
λ+. in preparation. math.LO/9906024
[Sh 587] Saharon Shelah. Not collapsing cardinals ≤ κ in (< κ)–support itera-
tions. Israel Journal of Mathematics, accepted. math.LO/9707225
[Sh 666] Saharon Shelah. On what I do not understand (and have something to
say). Fundamenta Mathematicae, to appear. math.LO/9906113
[Sh:b] Saharon Shelah. Proper forcing, volume 940 of Lecture Notes in Mathe-
matics. Springer-Verlag, Berlin-New York, xxix+496 pp, 1982.
[Sh 177] Saharon Shelah. More on proper forcing. The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
49:1034–1038, 1984.
[Sh:f] Saharon Shelah. Proper and improper forcing. Perspectives in Mathe-
matical Logic. Springer, 1998.
[Sh:F259] Shelah, Saharon. Not collapsing cardinals ≤ κ in (< κ)–support itera-
tions II.
